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Abstract
Considerable growth in passive investing and the use of the exchange-traded fund (ETF)
introduce potential impacts to markets. Prior research is inconclusive on their effects on market
efficiency. Beginning with Shleifer (1986) and Harris & Gurel (1986) and extending through
studies such as Petajisto (2011), researchers have evidence of indexing influencing market
efficiency. The index inclusion effect is driven by non-fundamental demand (supply) shocks
initiated by S&P 500 inclusion (deletion) events. This dissertation systematically works through
passive investing or indexing to the exchange-traded fund (ETF), focusing on their effect on
underlying assets’ markets. By extending the carefully designed event studies for testing the
market’s efficiency from 1993 to 2021, this study investigates ETFs' influence on underlying
assets’ markets through the index inclusion effect. In addition to expanding the index inclusion
event studies through 2021, ETFs’ involvement in the mispricing event is explored by analyzing
the relationship between their underlying asset ownership and abnormal returns. This study finds
that although the S&P 500 index inclusion effect generates abnormal returns, similar to prior
research, the effect has largely disappeared over the last decade. Additionally, there is a
statistically significant relationship between the decreasing magnitude of abnormal returns and
the growth of ETFs. Finally, using an original price discovery method this study shows that there
is no significant return difference between ETFs that can avoid buying and selling at
disadvantage pricing introduced by the index inclusion effect and other less flexible ETFs.
Keywords: Pooled Investment Vehicles (PIV), Exchange Traded Products (ETP),
Exchange-Traded Funds (ETF), Passive Investing, Indexing, Index Inclusion Effect, Efficient
Market Hypothesis (EMH), Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT).
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CHAPTER 1 – INTRODUCTION
Asset management has experienced a dramatic shift from active to passive investment
strategy, partly through the exchange-traded fund (ETF) innovation. According to the Investment
Company Institute (2020), passively managed U.S. registered funds have taken share from
active, growing from 18% and $1.5 trillion in total net assets under management (AUM) in 2009
to 39% and $8.5 trillion in AUM in 2019. Although active management’s AUM grew an
impressive $6.5 trillion to a total of $13.5 trillion over the same period, index-tracking funds are
growing at a faster rate.
Additionally, among passive strategy funds, ETFs are taking market share from mutual
funds (MFs). The passive strategy draws in massive investments, mainly invested in large U.S.
stocks. ETFs continue to expand, securing 16.9% of the total assets invested in investment
companies in the U.S. in 2019, up from just 0.9% in 2000 (Investment Company Institute, 2020).
ETF growth is also seen by its rapid increase in investment companies or funds and AUM. Since
2000, ETFs have grown 2,619% by number and 6,561% by AUM, while MFs have experienced
12.8% in number and 206% in AUM (Investment Company Institute, 2020). Focusing on the
most recent decade, passively managed ETFs grew from $680 billion in AUM in 2009 to $4,250
billion in 2019, a 526% growth compared to 400% growth for passive MFs (Investment
Company Institute, 2020).
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Another measure illustrating the growth of the ETF is trading volume. According to BenDavid et al. (2017), in the first half of 2016, with only 10% of the market’s capitalization, ETF
daily trading volume was greater than 33% of the overall market. Across many measures, passive
investing and ETFs are growing at incredible rates, as these powerful, innovative ideas shape the
financial landscape by securing a larger share of U.S. investment assets (see Figures 1, 4, and 5).
However, little is confirmed about the effects of the considerable growth of passive
investing and ETFs on the U.S. stock market, as research remains inconclusive on their impacts
on market efficiency (Ben-David et al., 2017). One area of research which documents potential
market inefficiency from passive investing is the index inclusion effect. Carefully designed event
studies reveal market mispricings when an index, tracked by passively managed funds, adds or
deletes an asset (Shleifer, 1986; Harris & Gurel, 1986).
This study researches the ETF innovation’s participation in the index inclusion effect.
The index inclusion effect is revisited and extended by following prior research’s carefully
designed event studies for measuring the S&P 500 inclusions’ and deletions’ impact on
underlying assets’ markets. The resulting abnormal returns are analyzed with ETFs’ daily
holdings data provided by FactSet’s ETF Datafeed for informing about ETFs’ participation
within the index inclusion effect. This research focuses on U.S. equity markets investigating
ETFs’ influence on underlying assets’ markets in the index inclusion effect.
Investment Strategies
Generally, there are two investment strategies for investors: active and passive. Active
management is diverse and, as a strategy, depends on the ability of an individual or entity to
invest resources for achieving above-average risk-adjusted returns. When individual investors
allocate financial resources to active funds, this typically involves paying a knowledgeable
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manager to invest in assets designed to outperform the overall market. A benchmark or index is
intended to measure the market's performance or a distinct collection of assets. Active managers
make asset ownership decisions using various methods, attempting to surpass the benchmark and
secure excess returns for their clients.
While indexing is a form of passive investing, this paper often uses the terms
interchangeably, especially when discussing passive versus active investment approaches. The
passive strategy is executed by purchasing assets that mimic an index, most often implemented
by creating funds that closely track the same benchmark that active funds attempt to beat.
Although indices have been around a while, the average retail investor's ability to track an index
is relatively new.
The Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT) and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH)
support the passive investing strategy. As discussed in more detail later, Sharpe (1963, 1991)
explains the advantages of passive over active investing when developing, through aggregation,
the security market line (SML) and his foundational capital asset pricing model (CAPM).
Additionally, Fama (1991) describes the highly efficient modern markets, as markets effectively
use all material public information for pricing assets.
The markets’ rapid information consumption and accurate asset pricing, coupled with
passive management’s low fees and diversified risk, make average performance attractive,
challenging the active management strategy. As research supports the passive strategy, investors
migrate from active managers to passive funds (see Figures 1 and 5). Statistically, the Standard
& Poor’s Index Versus Active (SPIVA) scorecard, created and maintained by S&P Global,
analyzes and tracks the active versus passive investment strategy debate's historical performance.
The SPIVA semiannual scorecard routinely finds passive (indexing) outperforms active across
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almost every measure. Additionally, research on actual fund performance supports the passive
strategy. For example, using reasonable assumptions, if the typical investor switched to a passive
portfolio, they would increase average annual returns by 67 basis points (French, 2008).
Investment Funds
Pooled investment vehicles (PIV) are funds divided into shares that investors buy for
implementing active and passive strategies to secure returns. Essentially, PIVs offer investors
diversified exposure to various risks with low initial investment through shares. Diversification
is fundamental to investing and, through covariance, reduces risk while securing similar returns.
Pooling resources for purchasing diverse assets is an essential function of PIVs, increasing
investment performance, as measured by risk-adjusted returns.
The ETF is a relatively recent PIV innovation, which originated as an index-tracking fund
supporting the passive investment strategy. As mentioned earlier, ETFs grew at an incredible
rate, 526%, from 2009 to 2019. This growth is aligned with the rise of the powerful ideas of
passive investing, which grew at 456% over the same period. Together, they are changing the
financial landscape, securing an increasing percentage of the available AUM, as seen in Figure 1.
A primary reason for ETF’s significant growth is that they provide low-cost
diversification. Diversification offers a considerable risk/return benefit, as diversified portfolios
achieve similar returns to less diversified portfolios with significantly less risk (Markowitz,
1952). Additionally, diversification enables investors to manage risk-adjusted returns, allowing
riskier investments within a portfolio while controlling overall risk. ETFs, like other funds, offer
diversification, typically through offering investors shares with fractional ownership of hundreds
of holdings within one investment vehicle. ETFs have helped to democratize investing by
making diversification affordable for investors.
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Additionally, ETFs deliver inexpensive custom exposures for investors to reach
investment goals. The passively managed ETF enables the passive strategy at a low cost and is
gaining acceptance by many types of investors. Figure 1 shows the increase in the passive
investment strategy and ETFs’ participation as a share of the growth.
Figure 1
U.S. Funds: Passive vs. Active by Total Net Assets

Note. Adapted with permission from “60th Edition Investment Company Fact Book,” by
Investment Company Institute, 2020. (https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/pdf/
2020_factbook.pdf.). Copyright 2020 by Investment Company Institute.
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The Index Inclusion Effect
Financial theory relies on aggressive market participation, which acts to price and
distribute financial assets. Scholes (1972) studied the markets’ ability to arbitrage potential
mispricings using large block trades, but the transaction itself contains inseverable information
that the market uses for price determination. However, indexing provided researchers with a
clean experiment for testing the expected market activity that financial theory predicts (Petajisto,
2011). Unlike the large block trades, passive funds mechanically tracking an index presents an
uninformed demand (supply) shock when an index adds (deletes) an asset.
Separate studies by Shleifer (1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986) originate the findings of
the index inclusion effect by documenting an approximately 3% index premium. Later studies
using various indices and slightly different methods confirm the index inclusion effect. The
research performed by Petajisto (2011) brought the S&P 500 index inclusion effect data through
2005.
Uniquely designed event studies reveal the economic impact on firms across multiple
events within the index inclusion effect. Additionally, this research addresses the inclusion, and
the deletion events with separately executed studies. However, this study will often refer to a
change in firms by an index, both inclusions and deletions, simply as the index inclusion event.
Numerous prior studies observe abnormal returns (ARs) for the index inclusion event.
The ARs are concentrated on the announcement date (AD) and inclusion/deletion dates (ID/DD).
Furthermore, reversion of the abnormal returns is also observed over the event windows,
suggesting mispricing or inefficiencies. The ARs determined from the event studies for the index
inclusion event exist for both the inclusions and deletions.
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Research Questions
ETFs are a relatively new area of study, but more information about their effect on
underlying assets’ markets is emerging. In early 2023, ETFs will experience their 30 th
anniversary in the U.S. marketplace. Available data and investor interest are pushing researchers
to study this innovation’s impact on financial markets. As Lettau and Madhavan (2018) observe,
current published research is not abundant, as ETF literature is at an early stage. Still, as the
financial industry experiences shifts in investors’ resource allocation, understanding how this
influences market operations, to include changes to the index inclusion effect, is needed.
This study addresses the following research questions:


RQ1: What is the effect of the increase in the passive strategy and ETFs on the index
inclusion effect?



RQ2: How do ETFs influence underlying assets’ markets within index inclusion events?



RQ3: Do ETFs participate in index inclusion events differently?
This study explores how passively managed ETFs participate and influence underlying

assets’ markets by leveraging prior research on passive investing's index inclusion effect. This
study adds to research in many areas but provides original insight in three specific ways. First,
this study is the first to explore ETFs’ participation in underlying assets’ markets through
inefficiencies observed in index inclusion events. With the increasing use of the passive strategy
and the ETF, it is critical to understand how markets are affected. Second, using the index
inclusion event window and FactSet’s ETF Datafeed, this is the first study to explore how ETFs
with differing asset selection flexibility behave when purchasing and selling new underlying
assets. With many similar ETF variables constant and unique ETF daily holding volume
available, this study can explore distinct ETF trading behavior when an index adds or deletes an
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underlying asset. Third, a new and original application of a price discovery method is developed.
The weighted price contribution (WPC) method motivates the creation of an entirely new metric
uniquely designed for investigating portfolios’ (Mutual Fund, ETF, etc.) returns generated over a
period of time, like the index inclusion event window.
Organization of the Study
This chapter presented the motivation for the research opportunity and introduced the
unique event that establishes a natural test for analyzing indexing’s impact on market efficiency.
Additionally, three research questions were formed to understand the current state of the index
inclusion effect and explore ETF’s participation. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.
Chapter 2 reviews the literature, investigating the concepts, theory, and prior research for
identifying gaps and generating hypotheses. Chapter 3 describes the research’s methods,
including the overall design, the event study, price discovery, the sample selection procedures,
the initial data, and measures. Chapter 4 presents the data, analysis, and findings of the study.
Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of the results, limitations, and recommendations for future
research.
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CHAPTER 2 – LITERATURE REVIEW
The asset management industry is experiencing a transformation as many investors are
switching their strategy and fund selection. These investment decisions may be influencing
market operations. This chapter reviews research informing about passive investing and the ETF
innovation’s effect on their underlying assets’ markets.
Although passive investing or indexing is not new, ETFs are, relative to other funds, in
their early years. As investors rely on ETFs for returns, the funds and their effects on markets
need to be increasingly researched. One area of passive investing research is the index inclusion
effect, which provides a unique natural experiment for the non-fundamental demand (supply)
shock that impacts an underlying asset’s market pricing. Relevant financial, economic theory,
and prior research literature are examined for analyzing the increase in passive investing and
ETFs’ effect on underlying assets’ markets' ability to price.
This section is divided into four corresponding parts. The first part provides a review of
finance theory related to market efficiency. The second part discusses passive investing and
offers academic support for the strategy. The third part gives a brief overview of pooled
investment vehicles (PIV), ending with details about the exchange-traded fund (ETF), as the
original ETFs are intimately tied to passive investing (indexing). Last, recent, relevant passive
indexing and ETF literature are discussed, leading to the hypotheses for this study.
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Theoretical Foundation
A brief introduction to some pioneers responsible for creating and shaping the Modern
Portfolio Theory (MPT), the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), and passive investing is
provided next. The purpose is to introduce some of the foundational theories leveraged by this
study and responsible for the exchange-traded fund (ETF) innovation. MPT provides insight into
the formation of many index funds, including the ETFs. Arrow, Debreu, Lintner, Markowitz,
Miller, Modigliani, Samuelson, Sharpe, and Tobin are primarily credited with evolving portfolio
theory from concept to rigorous economic theory (Varian, 1993). Research from some of these
great economists will be briefly discussed as their work contributes to and forms the MPT. The
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is then discussed, along with some of its implications. The
efficient operation of markets is a vital pillar for this research, as it is necessary for this
research’s method – the event study.
Modern Portfolio Theory. Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) seminal work formalized the
relationship of risk with expected returns and documented the power of diversification. Along
with developing the primary risk-return relationship, the efficient frontier was established. The
efficient frontier is the graphical leading edge of returns and risk, representing the maximum
expected returns at a given level of risk or the minimum risk for a given level of return.
Markowitz demonstrated diversification by focusing on the portfolio’s risk, depending on assets’
variance and covariance (Markowitz, 1952). Markowitz (1952) is credited with formalizing the
power of diversification to reduce portfolio risk through covariance. This seminal research
marked the beginning of MPT (Varian, 1993).
In combining a risk-free asset with risky assets that construct the efficient frontier, the
optimal portfolio for all investors may be realized (Tobin, 1958). Further, the portfolio that
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maximizes returns with the lowest risk is a straight line (Tobin, 1958) with the slope equal to the
Sharpe ratio (Sharpe, 1963, 1964). When the risk-free (rf) asset is combined with the risky
assets, a line may be drawn from the rf investment, tangent to the risky optimal portfolio curve
(the efficient frontier). This line shows the maximum return for an investor’s given level of risk,
usually described as an investor’s risk aversion or inversely as risk tolerance. This combined set
of assets is referred to as the risk optimized portfolio, providing the greatest return for the
specified level of risk. The construction of the optimal risk portfolio is illustrated in Figure 2.
Tobin’s finding simplified portfolio selection as it shows the risky asset portfolio was the same
for all investors, leaving only the weighting between the two (rf and risky) up to an investor’s
risk aversion (Varian, 1993).
Figure 2
Risk Optimized Portfolio

MPT then evolved to an approach leveraging the market model or single-factor model for
constructing optimal portfolios. The model was welcomed as the Markowitz method requires
many estimated inputs within a difficult to visualize model and correlation matrices which are
data-heavy and error-prone. Sharpe (1964) captured most of the expected return and risk
11

movement in a single factor model. The linear relationship of an asset’s expected returns with the
markets can be estimated using ordinary least squares. The coefficients are then used for
calculating covariances, leveraged for constructing optimal portfolios (Varian, 1993). The
parsimonious single-index model reduces the optimization problem's dimensionality, easing the
calculation of variances, covariances, and expected returns (Sharpe, 1964).
Sharpe continued working with portfolio theory but shifted from an individual’s portfolio
toward equilibrium theory within the capital markets (Varian, 1993). This work resulted in the
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1963, 1964). CAPM aggregates market risk and
returns across all investible assets, assuming all investors are alike. It provides the average
expected returns for all the available assets within the market, graphically represented by the
Security Market Line (SML). The aggregate relationship of individual optimizing behavior to an
equilibrium market theory was also derived by Lintner (1965). It resulted in many powerful tools
like the SML, which expresses the equilibrium of risk and return trade-off for the market and
individual securities. CAPM and the SML provide a benchmark for what it means for an asset to
be reasonably priced. CAPM is genuinely a revolutionary discovery that leverages competition
for assets for achieving fair prices. Additional research has eased many of the original
assumptions and added a few CAPM qualifications (Sharpe, 1991). However, as Varian (1993)
states, CAPM is still widely taught and used in practice, making it one of financial economics’
foundational achievements.
The CAPM implication, known as the Mutual Fund Theorem, holds that the market
portfolio is efficient and optimal and justifies passively managed index-tracking market
portfolios. Additionally, since CAPM’s insights are driven by equilibrium, individual asset
returns (alpha) are forced to zero, so the SML does not model alpha. CAPM’s market discoveries
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intensified the debate around active versus passive management strategies (Treynor & Black,
1973).
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) achieves similar findings through different assumptions,
adding validity to the results. APT theorizes that individual asset returns are driven to zero by
market equilibrium, specifically by fierce investor competition through arbitrage. APT provides
similar outcomes, with fewer limitations, supporting the position that, in aggregate, the market
returns are optimal (Ross, 1976).
The MPT shows that diversifying and building a portfolio reduces idiosyncratic risk. The
expansion to single-index market models, like CAPM, are groundbreaking financial innovations.
Two MPT outcomes are its support for efficient markets and its foundation for passive investing.
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). Although introducing concepts of the EMH
through the late 1960s, it was not until 1970 that Fama kicked off one of the greatest
intellectually stimulating hypotheses in all of finance, the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Sewell,
2011). Over the past 50 years, challenges and defenses of the EMH have led to continued
discovery and understanding of markets, especially the U.S. stock market (Asness & Liew,
2014). The EMH is leveraged in two ways by this research. First, along with MPT, is its support
for passive investing and the original ETF. Second, the EMH supports the event study method,
and with each successful study grows more valid.
Like the MPT, the EMH is another powerful theme within financial economics. Fama
(1970) released his first of three reviews of the EMH in 1970, stating three forms of the EMH.
This research was released over five years after his work supporting the market's random walk,
which challenged technical research’s veracity (Fama, 1965). The weak, semi-strong, and strong
forms of the EMH offered varying levels of challenges to sell and buy-side analysts, asset
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managers, and investors. The EMH coheres with MPT findings, specifically MPT’s
independently derived market equilibrium models (Sharpe, 1964; Lintner, 1965; and Ross,
1976), strengthening the case for market efficiency. Still, the EMH is not fully embraced as some
academics, and many investors are not convinced that the market is efficient or perhaps as
efficient as some forms of the EMH claim. Nevertheless, the EMH boldly questioned long-held
beliefs about active trading strategies, challenging the asset management industry.
The EMH deals with the market’s ability to take in information and accurately and
precisely price an asset. The EMH supporter believes that asset market prices reflect all material
information. Behaviorists argue this is not necessarily the case, as supply and demand for assets
may be determined by irrational investor desires (Asness & Liew, 2014). In support of the EMH
and to respond to criticism, Fama leveraged various models. Additionally, academics created and
evolved the event study method for better testing events’ impacts on assets’ prices (Ball &
Brown, 1968). Event studies' success demonstrates that the market does efficiently price
hypothesized events. However, as Asness and Liew (2014) point out, a joint hypothesis problem
exists because market efficiency may only be seen through an asset pricing model.
Behaviorists offer many examples of anomalies that EMH has difficulty explaining away.
In detail, Fama (1991, 1998) responds to market anomalies in additional reviews critical for
understanding both the theoretical functioning of markets and their natural operations. An area
where the EMH and behaviorist collide is in the definition of rational. Asset prices are likely
driven by an ever-changing mix of rational and behavioral forces in the real world, frustrating
researchers (Asness & Liew, 2014). Markets are perhaps one of the world's most significant
innovations, as they efficiently price and allocate resources effectively. However, markets are
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not magic, and their efficiency is dependent on the care and thought put into designing them and
making them fair through appropriate governance (Asness & Liew, 2014).
The impact of the debate, evolution, and findings supporting the EMH also validates the
event study method as an approach for testing hypotheses. Generally, theory informs what to
anticipate about an event that an event study is designed to detect. The events that are expected
to have a material economic impact are revealed through efficient markets.
Like the MPT, the EMH leads believers to embrace passive investing. After accepting
that markets are essentially efficient, the logical consequences challenge long-held asset
management strategies. For example, a critical conclusion that follows from the EMH includes
active management's ineffectiveness unless the investor has inside information. This conclusion
means that hard-working asset managers and smart corporate treasurers do not add value because
they cannot beat the market (Asness & Liew, 2014). The EMH and efficient operation of markets
is an essential element of the passive investing strategy. Index funds, lower investment costs, and
diversification are practical results of the EMH, making it arguably, one of the most important
financial innovations of the past 50 years (Asness & Liew, 2014).
Passive Investing (Indexing)
Ben-David et al. (2017) generally classify asset managers as implementing active or
passive investing strategies. Managers of active funds, whose performance is measured against a
benchmark, face several non-trivial problems. First, active investing requires resources for
optimizing stock selection and market-timing strategies for generating returns. Time, knowledge,
and money are applied for researching the investment universe for an advantage the market is not
already pricing. This effort is often referred to as “seeking alpha.” The relatively expensive
pursuit of finding alpha must cost less than the advantage as the expense decays returns. Second,
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active managers adjust their portfolios for timing and selecting outperforming assets
dynamically, which increases expenses. Another cost for the active manager is paying staff and
themselves for all their time and knowledge.
Passive investing is a strategy that attempts to match the returns of an index or a
“benchmark.” The strategy is executed by investing in each indices’ constituents in line with its
representation in the index (Sushko & Turner, 2018). The idea is to be the market’s efficient
frontier, diversifying the available investible assets in that investment area. Simply put, when an
investor owns the market, they own all the shares that make up the market (or a proxy of it), and
they will earn average returns of that benchmark.
Generally, passive funds employ two methods for tracking an index, physical replication,
and synthetic replication. Additionally, the two physical replication implementation methods
usually followed are either a full or partial process. Before describing physical replication in
more detail, here are a few brief points about synthetic replication.
Synthetic replication may be used for aligning returns with an index. As described by
Ben-David et al. (2017), synthetic ETFs use derivative contracts, like total return swaps, to track
their benchmark index. Still, it typically entails increased complexity in terms of underlying
assets (financial assets versus financial agreements) and risk (asset and market versus
counterparty). Synthetic funds (ETFs) expose investors to additional consequences, like
counterparty risks (Baker et al., 2019, p. 56).
Passively managed, index-tracking funds are designed to track an index physically.
Perfectly tracking the index requires the fund to match ownership of the assets, including market
capitalization (market cap) weighting. With full physical replication, the fund attempts asset
ownership in the index's exact weighting for achieving the lowest tracking error possible. Costs,
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like the bid-ask spread, are experienced as funds buy and sell shares of the underlying assets to
match the index's capitalization scheme. Therefore, along with a few other perturbations, like
dividend reinvestment strategies, physical full replication funds will underperform the index with
a slight expense drag. The focus is on urgent response to index changes, as mimicking the index
and reducing tracking error is the utmost goal. According to Blume and Edelen (2004), for an
indexer to maintain low tracking errors, they must diligently follow a full or exact replication
strategy.
However, as Madhavan (2016) discusses, most index funds do not fully replicate their
benchmarks and instead partially replicate, carefully designing their holdings to closely correlate
with the tracked index while fulfilling other goals (p. 63). A sponsor’s strategic selection of
assets allows funds (ETFs) to partially replicate the index and optimize their asset selection by
purchasing a subset of the index to reduce holdings and expenses. Some of the many advantages
of partial replication include setting and following fund strategies, avoiding difficult or
expensive assets, holding “off-benchmark” assets, legal flexibility, fee generation from lending
shares, and selecting shares with greater liquidity for reducing expenses.
According to Sharpe (1991), active management cannot outperform an index, as in
aggregate, the winners and losers must equal the average. This means that the investment style
(passive or active) is zero-sum, ignoring fees, as all deviations from capital weighting collective
trades must sum to zero. So, as modified from Madhavan (2016, p. 7), the argument goes:


Over any period, the market return is a weighted average of the assets' returns.



Passive investing obtains slightly less than market returns because of low fees (expenses
are low because there is no investment required to seek alpha, timing, or management).
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The market’s return is a zero-sum, equally-weighted average of the total dollars invested.
Therefore, the average actively managed fund must also achieve the market return.



But active management is expensive due to higher costs (transactions, management, and
research for seeking alpha).



Therefore, active management tends to underperform the benchmark and passive
investing (Ang, 2014).
Passive investing is taking more share from active management over time. Studies show

that alpha generation evidence exists; still, active managers as a group underperform index funds
(Wermers, 2000). Madhavan (2016) points out that when sample selection bias is factored in,
the difference from index funds is even more significant (p. 9). Active funds that perform poorly
are closed or merged and not used in the reporting, even though they are part of the available
pool at the investment decision time. When active performance is measured with accurate
benchmarks, as documented by S&P Global’s Dow Jones Indices, it falls short of the passive
strategy.
The S&P Dow Jones Indices publishes analysis, controlling for variations, and measuring
active funds' performance against their benchmarks. This analysis is contained in S&P Indices
Versus Active (SPIVA) reports. The 2020 mid-year analysis reports that 87.23% of all active
managers fail to beat their benchmark over 15 years (S&P Dow Jones, 2020). The theme
remains valid across all durations and fund categories with few exceptions, like shorter-duration
real estate funds and growth funds. In 2014, Madhavan (2016, p. 9) found:


Fewer than 10% of active managers beat their benchmark in 2014, underperforming
passive benchmarks over five years (U.S. large-cap mutual funds).
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There is no evidence that active managers do better in other (theoretically less efficient)
asset classes like emerging markets, small-cap stocks, and municipal bonds.



Active managers that outperform their index do not persist. Of the top quartile of funds in
2010, fewer than 50% were in the top quartile the following year, and just a few persisted
through 2014.
Academic theory from financial economics has informed investors that, on average,

active managers cannot beat the market because collectively, they are the market (Sharpe, 1991).
Still, passive investing was viewed with skepticism, thought initially to be too expensive, and
was not available for the retail investor until the late 1970s (Madhavan, 2016, p. 6). Passive
investing’s diversification required a lot of money (minimum investments) and many
transactions, making this strategy available to only the wealthy. The affluent were the only
investors who could effectively afford to take advantage. They had the resources to adequately
purchase a large number of low covarying assets for removing non-systematic risk.
As passive investing takes hold, the financial principles from MPT and the EMH can be
seen in passive investing innovations' practical application. As markets prove efficient, more
investors are embracing the passive strategy. If markets are efficient at pricing all information,
there is no incentive to pay for the information (Grossman & Stiglitz, 1980). Additionally,
diversification is seen in many of the PIVs. Although it took a few decades, financial innovations
like the Exchange Traded Fund (ETF) eventually emerged, providing less wealthy investors
affordable diversification. As a result, more assets are finding their way into passively managed,
diverse, PIVs and specifically in passively managed ETFs. ETF growth reflects the increasing
acceptance of passive investing established by financial economics, including accepting the
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value proposition of diversification and acknowledging the concept that market pricing is
informationally efficient.
The ETF is currently disrupting the asset management industry as the passive investing
strategy takes market share by delivering consistent, low-cost returns, beating most active
management strategies. ETFs are taking investment dollars from actively managed funds. U.S.
inflows to ETFs have been increasing by 25% or higher over the last ten years, while traditional
active mutual funds are experiencing a decrease of 3% per year over the same period (Madhavan,
2016, p. 3). And as Lettau and Madhavan (2018) point out, the most significant gains for the
ETF industry are coming at the expense of closed-end funds and more traditional active mutual
funds. Additionally, the ETF was favored in a recent study by Elton et al. (2018), designed to
assist investors in making decisions on passive investment fund types based on performance. The
bulk of passive investing is achieved through mutual funds or ETFs. When comparing the two
alternatives, the return is 9.4 basis points (bps) (a basis point represents 0.01%) higher per year
for institutional investors and 19.3 bps higher for retail investors when selecting the ETF (Elton
et al., 2018). Two themes about investors’ behavior emerge from recent data: passive investing is
growing at the expense of active, and ETFs are becoming the desired passive investing fund.
Pooled Investment Vehicles (PIV) and the Exchange-traded Fund (ETF)
With today’s available options, it is difficult to imagine what investing was like before
pooled investment vehicles (PIV). Mutual Funds (MF), Exchange Traded Products (ETPs) –
Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) and Exchange Traded Notes (ETNs), open-end funds (OEFs),
close-end funds (CEF), unit investment trusts (UITs), real estate investment trusts (REITs), and
their combinations represent many of the fund portfolio options available to investors. Many of
these financial products are provided in more detail by Baker et al. (2019) in their book, The
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Savvy Investor’s Guide to Pooled Investments, Madhavan’s (2016) book, Exchange Traded
Funds, and the New Dynamics of Investing, many journal articles, and informative periodicals.
This research concentrates on the ETF, a publicly offered PIV, which presents a few unique
advantages, but first some information on PIVs and MFs.
PIVs offer investors fractional diversification through combining resources. PIVs are
defined as investment funds that collect and combine cash from investors for creating portfolios
that deliver a specific investment objective (Baker et al., 2019, p. xix). Investors share ownership
of the portfolio in proportion to the size of the stakeholders’ investments. The two most
prominent families of PIVs are MFs and ETFs.
The most popular PIV by the number of funds and assets under management (AUM) is
the Mutual Fund (MF), with $21.3 trillion AUM in 2019 (Investment Company Institute, 2020).
An MF is an investment company that pools investors’ money for purchasing assets according to
its prospectus. The prospectus is a legal document that communicates specific investment details
about the fund’s objectives. Generally, MFs take three forms: OEF, CEF, or a UIT. Each type of
MF has its benefits and disadvantages. The shared ownership and pricing of MFs are based on
buying shares on the secondary market, typically at the fund’s net asset value (NAV). NAV is
calculated at the end of each trading day, at which time requested transactions occur. NAV is the
value of the MF assets, less any liabilities, divided by the number of shares outstanding.
A few other fund structures, which may also be characterized as part of the MF family,
are OEFs and CEFs. As previously stated, OEF shares are priced at the end of the trading day at
NAV. The OEF’s share volume is based on demand for the fund. The fund shares may be created
or destroyed based on the investor’s desire for the fund, and the fund’s size expands and
contracts with demand. The liabilities fluctuate depending on the fund's many complicating
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attributes, like advertising and its share origination process. CEFs are different because their
shares are fixed, and the fund does not expand or contract with demand. Many CEFs trade at
prices that vary from NAV. The CEF comprises many underlying assets and cannot respond to
demand, and suffers increased liquidity risk (Lettau & Madhavan, 2018). As a result, the CEF is
often traded at a discount to its NAV, often referred to as the closed-end fund puzzle (Lee et al.,
1990).
Over the years, MFs have exploded in popularity. Most impressive is the continued
growth in MFs’ AUM, with a staggering 36% growth over the past four years (from $15,657.9B
to $21,291.5B), as reported by Investment Company Institute (2020). According to Investment
Company Institute (2020), at the end of 2019, the U.S. Mutual Fund industry remained the
largest globally, with $21.3 trillion in total net assets across nearly 8,000 funds. Additionally,
AUM and the number of MFs have experienced astounding growth over the years, as depicted in
Figure 3.
The first known successful ETF was introduced in 1990 at the Toronto Stock Exchange
(TSX) called the Toronto Index Participation Shares (TIPs). State Street Global Advisors
(SSGA) introduced the first U.S. ETF in January 1993. The SEC approved the SSGA’s Standard
& Poor’s Depository Receipts (SPDR) S&P 500 ETF (SPY), known as “Spiders.” SPY’s goal is
to provide investment results that correlate or track the financial performance of the S&P 500.
The SPY is the largest ETF, with an AUM of $336.46 billion and an average daily trading
volume of $26.86 billion (ETF.com, 2021). Nathan Most, a 73-year-old physicist and U.S. Navy
veteran, developed the first commercial version of an exchange-traded fund for the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) (Madhavan, 2016, p. 16). According to Baker et al. (2019), ETFs have
since evolved through three major phases: first, U.S. and international equity indices; second,
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indexing other asset classes like bonds and derivatives; and, finally, introducing smart beta,
active, and nontraditional index funds (p. 52).
Figure 3
Mutual Funds: Total Net Assets and Fund Count

Note. Adapted with permission from “60th Edition Investment Company Fact Book,” by
Investment Company Institute, 2020. (https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/pdf/
2020_factbook.pdf.). Copyright 2020 by Investment Company Institute.
An ETF can be viewed as part of a larger family and is often referred to as a type of ETP.
An ETP is a PIV which like other funds, comingles money from investors and returns ownership
shares. The ETP is made up of a few kinds of investment wrappers. The largest ETP is the ETF.
The smaller and perhaps more dynamic and challenging to understand ETP is the ExchangeTraded Note (ETN), which includes leveraged ETFs (LETF) and the exchange-traded
commodity funds (ETCs) (SEC, 2012). The ETN and ETC are funds that hold more exotic
assets, like derivatives and silver or gold, respectively. Generally, these funds differ from the
ETF in a few critical ways. Leading the differences is what underlies the investment. An ETF’s
share is backed by a financial asset, where an ETN is generally backed by a firm’s ability to pay.
This means that the owner of a share of an ETN owns an obligation from a financial entity to
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pay, not a financial asset. The risk shifts from the variance in the direct return on an asset (within
an ETF) to the return on an outcome and the firm's ability to pay. The ability to pay is often
referred to as counterparty risk.
Figure 4 illustrates ETP’s classification for the global AUM, totaling $6.3 trillion for
year-end 2019 (Investment Company Institute, 2020).
Figure 4
U.S. ETF Market, Percent Total Assets, Year-End 2019

Note. Adapted with permission from “60th Edition Investment Company Fact Book,” by
Investment Company Institute, 2020. (https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/pdf/
2020_factbook.pdf.). Copyright 2020 by Investment Company Institute.
ETFs make available low-cost, diversified portfolios to the masses, once only accessible
to institutional investors. In this way, ETFs and passive investing have democratized investing as
retail investors with little investment capital can't replicate the diversified securities of an index.
For example, the time and cost of owning the 505 stocks in the S&P 500 index, even with recent
fractional ownership offered by discount brokerages like Robinhood, is time consuming and
resource intensive. Now, several S&P 500 passively managed index-tracking ETFs offer all
investors exposure to over 80% of the U.S. economy through a single vehicle (S&P Dow Jones
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Indices, 2020). Investors obtain fractional ownership of the ETF’s underlying assets and instant
diversification with low costs.
ETFs compete with the MFs for investors’ resources (see Figure 1) and are rapidly
increasing in popularity. As reported by FactSet (2020), ETFs’ AUM has grown from $927.6B to
$4,683.1B, or 404.9% over the past ten years, while MFs’ AUM has only increased by 89.9%.
ETFs' higher growth rate leading to gains in market share can be seen by comparing U.S. equity
ETFs with MFs (Figure 5).
Figure 5
New Flows of Cash for Passive and Active MFs and ETFs

Note. Reprinted with permission from “60th Edition Investment Company Fact Book,” by
Investment Company Institute, 2020 (https://www.ici.org/system/files/attachments/pdf/
2020_factbook.pdf. ). Copyright 2020 by Investment Company Institute
Figure 5 shows fund flows in indexed versus active funds broken out by MF or ETF.
Along with Figure 1, Figure 5 shows the shift in flows from active to passive, with most of the
passive growth in ETFs. Passively managed ETFs are stealing market share, placing pressure on
active managers, and, more generally, MFs, changing how they operate and invest.
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ETFs have unique characteristics while also sharing many attributes with MFs. Three
related ETF elements which make it unique are its share creation and redemption, the arbitrage
process, and intraday trading. These unique ETF elements, allowed by regulators, enable ETF
market pricing through creative supply and demand functions which facilitate ETF intraday
trading. The ETF elements will be generally summarized and contrasted with MFs to understand
critical differences and advantages.
The creation-redemption process for ETFs provides for its highly liquid status, supporting
intraday trading on organized exchanges. This fundamental ETF element highlights one of the
most significant differences between ETFs and other funds and investments. First, a quick
summary of the four creation-redemption participants. The first member involved in the ETF
share creation and redemption process is the ETF sponsor. As previously discussed, the sponsor
is typically a financial firm that has determined the need for an ETF based on investor demand
and leverages contractual relationships with other financial institutions (large broker-dealers),
forming authorized participants (APs). APs are second and perform intermediary actions for the
ETF sponsor. Generally, ETF demand is uniquely met through an arbitrage process by APs, the
designated market-making firms. An AP creates or redeems ETF shares in the primary market
with the ETF sponsor while completing hedging actions with the final two members, capital
markets and investors in the secondary markets.
Perhaps the best method for understanding the ETF creation/redemption process is
observing a diagram, as shown in Figure 6. The ETF architecture leverages aspects of both openend and closed-end mutual funds. Through some manipulation and exemptive relief from the
SEC, the ETF’s architecture and share creation mechanism can be seen. As Lettau and
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Madhavan (2018) create in Figure 6, with some numbering modifications for following along
with the text, the ETFs’ creation/redemption process executed by APs is provided.
Figure 6
ETF Creation/Redemption Architecture

Note. (Lettau & Madhavan, 2018)
APs are the center of the process and are ultimately responsible for the share creation and
redemption process. Figure 6 will be walked through for illustrating the creation process, which
is simplified into four steps.
1. The AP receives a demand for ETF shares from investors. When investor demand
requires, an AP coordinates the creation of ETF shares in the primary market with the
ETF sponsor.
2. The AP completes hedging actions in the secondary market for securing arbitrage
profits. The AP concurrently works in the secondary market to build the ETF shares
for profit as part of the arbitrage process. As the ETF demand moves prices away
from NAV, the AP locks in gains by procuring the basket of securities from the
capital markets.
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3. The AP delivers the basket of securities to the ETF sponsor for newly created ETF
shares. The exchange occurs in the primary market and is referred to as an “in-kind”
transfer. The AP transfers accumulated underlying assets in the size and quantity
reflective of the index of interest and exchanges them for new ETF shares.
4. The AP completes the arbitrage and creation cycle by delivering the ETF shares to the
investor in the secondary market.
In creation, the ETF sponsor gets the financial assets it needs for tracking its index, and
the AP receives ETF shares for resale in the secondary market. Redemption is executed in a
similar manner but in the reverse order of the creation process. Therefore, APs create new ETF
shares when demand is high and remove existing shares when demand is low through the
specific ETF arbitrage mechanism.
Unlike mutual funds, efficiency within the ETF creation/redemption process manages
ETF shares' flow, not investors or fund management, as share volume is based on demand that
does not affect existing ETF investors (Baker et al., 2019, p. 54). The ETF’s unique
creation/redemption process and intraday market trading may provide pricing advantages that
other kinds of funds (i.e., mutual funds) cannot emulate. As Baker et al. (2019) identify, the
creation/redemption process ensures ETFs’ share prices tightly track the net asset value (NAV)
of the underlying financial assets (p. 54).
The arbitrage process also provides liquidity (force liquidation) when excessive buying or
selling of an ETFs’ shares is experienced. After ETF shares are created, the shares find their way
into the secondary market, where most investors trade directly with each other in an organized
exchange. As Baker et al. (2019) note, about 89% of ETF trading activity is from retail investors
that do not interact with the ETF directly but with each other in the secondary market (p. 55).
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Only when there is net demand for new ETF shares will an AP deliver underlying assets to the
ETF sponsor for ETF shares.
An advantage for ETFs is the additional liquidity provided by intraday trading. As
previously discussed and unique for ETFs, they are bought and sold directly on the secondary
market from a standard brokerage account. They may be traded whenever markets are open,
receiving market prices. ETFs are, indeed, exchange traded. Mutual funds are not traded on
exchanges and are bought and sold through distribution channels or directly from a fund
company or broker.
The creation/redemption process delivers shares in the secondary market where they may
be priced. ETFs are uniquely priced, as they leverage intraday trading and market-driven
valuation. Intraday trading of an ETF, a basket of securities, enables the market to separately
price, based on demand, the basket of securities, which can alternatively find a value (NAV)
through aggregating individual market prices. As previously defined, NAV is a standard method
for calculating the current value of a fund based on the cumulative value of its underlying assets.
NAV is traditionally calculated by summing the value of all the fund’s underlying assets (net
assets) and subtracting any liabilities, then dividing the remaining value by the total number of
shares outstanding.
Like MFs, there are distinct valuation paths, including cost build-up, NAVs, and market
prices for ETFs; however, ETFs’ pricing may be tighter based on its unique, real-time arbitrage
process (Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, 2014). Ideally, and theoretically, the ETF market price
should equal the NAV (market prices of the underlying assets) at any given point in time,
typically referred to as the law of one price. For ETFs, like many other market assets, the law of
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one price is influenced by an arbitrage process. However, as previously described, the ETF
arbitrage process conducted by APs in the primary and secondary markets is unique.
The ETF trades intraday, commission-free, typically with high liquidity and low bid/ask
spreads. The additional flexibility delivered by ETF’s intraday trading on an exchange offers
another form of liquidity. An ETF investor can secure a quantity of shares by placing a market
order or secure a price by placing a limit order. Unlike mutual funds, ETF investors may use
other techniques, like stops, short selling, lending, and margin trades, for gaining leverage.
Additionally, most ETFs are represented in the derivative markets and have options traded on
them. Options allow ETF investors to use investment strategies (collars, call writing, hedging
with puts, etc.) for increasing returns and hedging exposures. However, ETF’s intraday trading
flexibility comes with each of these benefits’ risks. The market essentially determines the price
of the ETF through intraday trades by buyers and sellers.
Intraday ETF trading’s immediate cash conversion, although of limited benefit for longterm investors, is seen by analysts as an advantage over OEFs (Antoniewicz & Heinrichs, 2014).
Regardless, intraday trading assists in providing a level of liquidity to investors not offered by
mutual funds. ETFs are at least as liquid as their underlying assets and generally more liquid
(Lettau & Madhavan, 2018). Intraday trading provides investors with an additional level of
liquidity when institutions fail. As the indexing ETFs mature, they are responsible for a
significant and growing proportion of trading volume. In 2016, ETFs accounted for about onethird of U.S. equity trading volumes (Ben-David et al., 2017).
The ETF is a dynamic fund, and its structure is flexible, supporting many investment
options. Thus, deciding on the type and kind of ETF for investors is critical, and for researchers,
it should be considered before investigation as it may influence research results. Details about
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the unique, flexible, and complex ETF structure communicate the need for research to test
distinct ETF types. ETF types exhibit many unique differentiating qualities that distinguish ETFs
from other funds and define qualities that discriminate one type of ETF from another based on
specific, definable attributes. As Lettau and Madhavan (2018) pointed out, too little attention is
paid to the ETF’s diversity, as there is no single one, and potential concerns apply to specific
types. As such, this research focuses on a particular type and kind of ETF: The passively
managed, index-tracking ETF, which owns or holds large U.S. stocks as their underlying assets.
As previously discussed, this category is the most significant fund type for ETFs in terms of
AUM. They continue to grow with the passive strategy as fund flows divert from active
managers and are overtaking MFs as the leading passive investing vehicle, as seen in Investment
Company Institute’s (2020) analysis in Figure 1.
The primary performance measure for a passively-managed index-tracking ETF is its
tracking error. It is a critical performance indicator because it measures how closely the fund
(ETF) tracks its index. As Baker et al. (2019) document, how closely the ETF tracks its
benchmark indicates how poorly or well-run the fund is, and the best, most efficient ETFs
closely track the indices on which they are based (p. 79). Additionally, bigger funds, able to
leverage many AUM for the benefit of the ETF investors, most often perform better in tracking
their benchmark. As Baker et al. (2019) note, high AUM often translates into higher trading
volume, lower expense ratios, lower tracking error, and high shareholder confidence, which are
qualities consistent in the best ETFs (p. 79).
However, understanding the flexibility ETFs are provided for achieving high
performance or low tracking error is essential. ETF design and structure may require full
physical replication, like the early UIT style ETFs, SPY, and DIA (Madhavan, 2016, p. 28). Due
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to regulatory constraints and its investment company structure as a UIT, the SPY ETF must fully
replicate its index. These regulatory limitations make it less flexible when compared to other
passively managed, index-tracking S&P 500 ETFs, like the VOO and IVV. Vanguard’s VOO
and Blackrock’s IVV are incorporated OEFs and follow a more flexible sampling process, which
allows them to partially replicate the S&P 500 index.
The investment convenience brought by the ETF innovation is revolutionary. Retail
investors may invest small sums through discount brokerages online with no commissions,
essentially diversifying away all idiosyncratic risk. Additionally, investors may choose from a
growing list of ETF offerings for maximizing diversification across the investment universe, like
no other time in history. Even with benefits like low costs and diversification, perhaps the ETF's
most potent advantage is how it is traded.
Passive Investing (Indexing) and ETF Research
Passive investing and the funds leveraged for implementing the strategy are actively
researched for understanding their effects on individual assets’ markets. According to Agapova
(2011), there were relatively few studies and, therefore, not a lot of published academic research
available about ETF innovation due to limited data. However, nearly a decade later, the data
needed for measuring ETF effects are now becoming significant, as approximately 28 years of
the growing number of funds and AUM have substantially increased, making the study of this
emerging innovation possible. Currently, research is divided on some of the indexing’s effects
experienced by underlying assets. As Ben-David et al. (2017) observe, although there is a
significant amount of research, little is confirmed about the effects that passive investing and
indexing, partially through ETFs, bring to the U.S. stock markets.
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Research is inconclusive on how passive investing and ETFs impact their underlying
assets, specifically in the securities markets (Ben-David et al., 2017). Some studies find that
financial markets are becoming more efficient, while others show adverse effects on price
efficiency and welfare (Ben-David et al., 2017). Additionally, the contrasting views are
theoretical and empirical. As Ben-David et al. (2017) observe, it is possible that coexisting but
opposite effects impact a market’s ability to accurately price, making them simultaneously more
informationally efficient and noisily mispriced.
Non-fundamental shocks, information, and noise. A general distinction between noise
and information is important. Largely, information and noise from investors about assets are
simultaneously passed to the market, which efficiently prices it. Noise contrasts with
information, as informed institutional investors that trade on information correctly expect to earn
profits, while uninformed retail investors trading on noise incorrectly believe they will profit
(Black, 1986). Many researchers categorize market activity in these two broad classifications.
The noise investor is generally the retail, uninformed, unsophisticated, or dumb trader. In
contrast, the information class of investors includes the institutional, informed, sophisticated, or
intelligent trader. Therefore, it follows that information provided to markets leads to fundamental
pricing and asset values, while noise does not. Additionally, noise may be considered an “alpha”
opportunity for informed investors (Stambaugh, 2014), as an indication of noise is a price
reversion experienced shortly after a mispricing event (Brown et al., 2019).
Information and noise are often used to describe the quality of an event or shock (Brown
et al., 2019; Davies, 2017). A shock can be from either the demand or supply side. Shocks, with
material or fundamental information, move prices to a new legitimate, informed level. Most
noisy shocks temporarily move prices that soon revert to their fair value. When price reversion is
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observed from a shock, the “non-fundamental” expression is used to qualify the noisy event. An
information-less shock is a volume event that is often referred to as a non-fundamental shock. A
non-fundamental demand shock is not generated from information. Instead, a non-fundamental
shock source is some form of noise or investor sentiment, for example. Non-fundamental
demand (supply) shocks are measurable and likely to revert to the fundamentally supported
market-determined pricing levels backed by information (Brown et al., 2019; Davies, 2017).
Theoretical. Stambaugh (2014) argues that passive investing increases the market’s
efficiency, while Bond and Garcia (2018) engage from a different perspective and explain that
indexing may decrease the market’s ability to price assets. According to Stambaugh (2014), as
noisy, exploitable, uninformed investors become passive investors, it removes alpha
opportunities for the active management strategy and increases market efficiency as alpha and
active traders fade. Therefore, as U.S. markets experience increasing growth in passive investing,
arbitrageurs’ prospects dissipate, meaning the market becomes more efficient. For active
managers, seeking and finding alpha becomes increasingly unlikely as the passive investing
strategy increases in the market. However, Bond and García (2018) build a benchmark model for
studying indexing’s effect on the market’s investors and conclude that the market’s aggregate
price efficiency falls, providing evidence that indexing reduces investors’ welfare (Bond &
Garcıa, 2018). It is important to note that Bond and Garcia’s findings are not necessarily in direct
opposition with Stambaugh, meaning they are not mutually exclusive. The theorized effects may
coincide, as Ben-David et al. (2017) noted.
Empirical. Empirically, research provides evidence that passively managed, indextracking products, like ETFs, either positively or negatively affect underlying assets’ markets by
increasing or diminishing their ability to price assets accurately. Researchers find evidence on
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both sides from indexing’s impact. First, empirical research focused on the index inclusion
effect, documenting mispricing caused by indexing is reviewed. This is followed by prior
research supporting increased market efficiency related to indexing and ETFs.
Index inclusion effect. Financial economics theories like CAPM (Sharpe, 1964),
Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) (Ross, 1976), EMH (Fama, 1965, 1970, 1991, 1998), and even
the capital structure theory (Modigliani & Miller, 1958) depend on competitive arbitrage within
the markets for keeping the supply and demand for individual assets at their fundamentally
supported values. The theories rely upon market participants to arbitrage any asset’s premium
(alpha) through the use of substitute assets, resulting in risk-free profits. According to Scholes
(1972), this fierce competition and resulting arbitrage is what makes markets so efficient. As
Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) state, one of the foundational theories of efficient markets is
the Scholes arbitrage.
Over the years, researchers investigated large block trades for testing foundational
finance theories, attempting to show the pricing efficiency of markets. An issue with this
approach is that the transaction itself may contain information that the market should price.
Therefore, either a model is needed for measuring the quality of information contained in the
trading event or another trading event without pricing information, a non-fundamental demand
(NFD) or supply (NFS) shock needed to be found. As passive investing began to take hold,
indices that passive investing funds track provided such an event. The S&P 500 index started
announcing additions and deletions in 1976. Many researchers have studied the S&P 500
inclusion event and other indices for the market’s potential mispricing, testing long-held
fundamental finance theories.
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Wurgler (2010) discusses indexing creating distortions in securities, explicitly
referencing the index inclusion event. In a foundational event study focused on inclusion and
deletion effects, Shleifer (1986) finds pricing distortions, suggesting downward-sloping demand
curves for securities. In another original study, Harris and Gurel (1986) similarly find evidence
that markets misprice assets upon the inclusion event. Lynch and Mendenhall (1997) recreate
Shleifer’s and Harris and Gurel’s studies with similar findings and focus on the reversion for
both the additions and deletions upon the inclusion dates, providing further evidence of the
mispricing event. Additionally, Kaul et al. (2000) demonstrate market pricing inefficiencies
through downward-sloping demand curves using the 1996 Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE)
redefinition of public float events. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya (2002) similarly find pricing
inefficiency in markets because investors view assets as imperfect substitutes, deterring riskaverse arbitrageurs from flatting demand curves.
However, in an extension of Shleifer’s work, Denis et al. (2003) use analysts’ estimates
of earnings per share (EPS) for examining indexing’s informational content and find that
inclusion is an informational event. Denis et al. (2003) find the rationale for the index inclusion
effect and support for The Information Content Hypothesis (ICH), contending that the event
transmits material information. But Hrazdil and Scott (2009) analyzed improved sources and
determined that the index inclusion event does not provide any new information, rejecting the
ICH.
Additional index inclusion effect studies include Chen et al. (2004), who document an
asymmetric price response between inclusions and deletions, finding a permanent increase in
added firms' prices but a transitory price decline in deleted firms, further mystifying market
mispricings. Additionally, Chang et al. (2013) find evidence of the index inclusion effect in both
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the S&P 500 and Russell indices after adjusting for earnings news using a regression
discontinuity design. Finally, in investigating the index inclusion effect originated by Shleifer
(1986) and Harris and Gurel (1986), Petajisto (2011) finds support for the continued mispricing
of the S&P 500 indices’ underlying assets when extending the research through 2005. Further,
Petajisto (2011) develops the index premium, which investors pay for mechanically tracking an
index using various existing funds.
All these studies leverage indexing’s formation of a natural, non-fundamental shock
event for testing the market’s ability to price efficiently. The effect is now known as the index
inclusion effect. The index inclusion effect creates lasting changes in securities’ prices, known as
the indexing premium (Wurgler, 2010).
Evidence for indexing and ETFs increasing market efficiency. Some researchers
believe that additional information is provided by ETF demand, as both retail and institutional
investors are increasingly leveraging the low-cost, flexible vehicle (Stratmann & Welborn, 2012;
Madhavan, 2014; Ben-David et al., 2014). According to Ben-David et al. (2017), as ETF demand
expands, material information is pushed into ETF prices that are systematically transmitted to
their underlying assets by APs arbitrageurs. Some researchers find this ETF process enhances
price discovery and liquidity for their underlying assets. Research supporting ETFs’ positive
effect on price discovery and increased liquidity for markets is led by Madhavan (Madhavan,
2014; Madhavan & Sobczyk, 2014; Madhavan, 2016 ; Lettau & Madhavan, 2018). In addition to
Madhavan, Lettau, and Sobczyk, other empirical research reinforces the view that ETFs improve
price discovery. Buckle et al. (2018) study relative price discovery for major indices and find
index ETFs have subsumed the role of price discovery from futures contracts, leading pricing
movements. Additionally, Marshall et al. (2013) research commodities for liquidity
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commonalities and find that funds (e.g., Hedge, MF, and ETFs), especially when the liquidity of
the underlying asset is constrained on the supply side (often the case with commodities) price
ahead of the underlying. Li and Zhu (2016) find that ETFs provide an alternative short-selling
method for difficult to short securities, allowing arbitrage which contributes to a more
informationally efficient market. Using the SPDRs, (SPY) ETF, Richie et al. (2008) show
mispricings exist between the ETF and their underlying portfolio and those deviations occur with
greater volume in high volatility environments, but do not last long (two to five and a half
minutes). These findings support market efficiency in that ETF mechanisms limit the window for
arbitraging mispricings. Upon detection of mispricing, APs and arbitrageurs have minutes to sellhigh and buy-low to lock-in profits. In addition to the reaction time and the detection of the
mispricing, the investor must also be able to execute a large-block trade for securing the profit.
Glosten et al. (2016) investigate the effects of ETFs on the informational efficiency of their
underlying assets and find that for stocks with weak informational environments and
competitively deficient markets, ETF activity increases market efficiency. By dividing noise
from informed trades in ETFs, Wermers and Xue (2015) separate noise propagation from price
discovery and find an ETF noise trader has no long-term impact on underlying asset volatility,
while informed trades’ price discovery persists.
Hypotheses
Prior research provides evidence that indexing generates volume shocks through funds
like the ETF that transmit information and noise to underlying assets, simultaneously increasing
and decreasing efficiency. According to Ben-David et al. (2017), conflicting evidence of
underlying asset pricing is not necessarily inconsistent, as underlying asset prices reacting to
information and noise from NFD(S) shocks are not mutually exclusive. Continuing the research
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from the index inclusion effect through 2021 provides insight and adds to the literature,
suggesting passively managed funds decrease efficiency.
To address RQ1, the index inclusion effect event studies explore the S&P 500 index
inclusions and deletions by extending the research to include the period of time ETFs have been
trading in the U.S. markets, from 1993 through 2021. Additionally, the abnormal returns (ARs)
are used for addressing RQ2 and the event studies’ windows for RQ3. As established in prior
research, the expectation is for market pricing during the index inclusion event to continue to
diverge from theoretically ideal markets. Therefore, when extending the index inclusion event
studies using data from 1993 to 2021, the index inclusion effect is expected to continue into
2021. The hypotheses provided in H1, H2, H3, H4, and H5 capture the expected behavior of the
ARs as observed in prior research and are illustrated for reference in Figure 7.
Figure 7
Prior Research Expected Abnormal Return (AR) Behavior

Note. 1 (Petajisto, 2011)
Most research on the index inclusion event focuses on the abnormal returns at or on the
event dates (Shleifer, 1986; Harris & Gurel, 1986; Lynch & Mendenhall, 1997; Chen et al. 2004;
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Petajisto, 2011; Patel & Welch, 2017). Therefore, the research suggesting positive abnormal
returns for inclusions for H2a, H4a, and H5a is well established in literature. Deletions, although
occurring in fewer studies is relatively well documented beginning with Lynch and Mendenhall
(1997), and more robustly with Chen et al. (2004), Petajisto (2011), and Patel and Welch (2017)
with strong evidence of negative abnormal returns supporting the hypothesis construction for
H2b, H3b, and H5b. Additionally, significant research for the immediate and sustained
reversions, for both inclusions and deletions, experienced after the ID/DD is well established in
literature (Lynch & Mendenhall, 1997; Chen et al., 2004; Petajisto, 2011; Patel & Welch, 2017).
These studies suggest a reversion after the change date (DD/ID) supporting the direction
hypothesized by H3a and H3b. Finally, the pre-event window is supported by the work of
Petajisto (2011). Both hypotheses H1a for the inclusions and H1b for the deletions, are supported
by the findings that abnormal returns are observed prior to the announcement of the S&P 500
index inclusion event.
The H1 hypotheses are directional due to the announcement event's differing addition and
deletion experiences. They are focused on the pre-event period, looking for AR drift due to
information leakage from the S&P index committee. The cumulative average abnormal return
(CAAR) is the AR measure used for testing this and other hypotheses. The H1 hypotheses for
addressing the first research question are:


H1a: The CAARs for the firms added in the index inclusion event are positive from six
days before the AD to the day before the AD.



H1b: The CAARs for the firms deleted in the index inclusion event are negative from six
days before the AD to the day before the AD.
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The next period of interest is the event period which is the critical area where the ARs
expected from the index inclusion event should be observed beginning with the AD and
continuing through the ID/DD. The hypotheses provided in H2 are directional due to the
inclusion event's differing addition and deletion experiences. The H2 hypotheses for further
addressing the first research question are:


H2a: The CAARs for the firms added in the index inclusion event are positive from the
AD up to and including the ID (day 0).



H2b: The CAARs for the firms deleted in the index inclusion event are negative from the
AD up to and including the DD (day 0).
Additionally, in evaluating the index inclusion event using current data, exploring the

quality of the mispricing event through the entire event window is essential. Consistent with
prior research, it is expected that reversion of the ARs begins after the ID or DD. The
expectation is to continue to see the reversion from the NFD(S) shock, further documenting that
the AD events are due to market pricing inefficiencies. The AR reversion of the index inclusion
effect immediately after the ID/DD is expected to continue into 2021. The hypotheses provided
in H3 are directional due to the inclusion event's differing addition and deletion experiences. The
H3 hypotheses for further addressing the first research question are:


H3a: The CAARs for the firms added in the index inclusion event are negative from the
day after ID to ten days post ID.



H3b: The CAARs for the firms deleted in the index inclusion event are positive from the
day after ID to ten days post DD.
The last evaluation includes the actual events, the AD event, and the ID/DD event. This is

the concentrated analysis over the precise areas where the ARs expected from the index inclusion
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event should be observed. Each of the two dated events (AD and ID/DD) will be observed over
the three days surrounding each event. The hypotheses provided in H4 and H5 are directional
due to the inclusion event's differing addition and deletion experiences. The H4 and H5
hypotheses for further addressing the first research question are:


H4a: The CAARs for the firms added in the index inclusion event are positive for the
three days surrounding the AD.



H4b: The CAARs for the firms deleted in the index inclusion event are negative for the
three days surrounding the AD.



H5a: The CAARs for the firms added in the index inclusion event are positive for the
three days surrounding the ID.



H5b: The CAARs for the firms deleted in the index inclusion event are negative for the
three days surrounding the DD.
With theoretical and empirical research providing contradictory evidence on the market’s

ability to price, it is difficult to hypothesize if the market is becoming more or less efficient over
time. Despite these conflicts, one powerful theme continues with passive investing’s and ETFs’
growth: the continued decrease of “alpha” opportunities postulated by Stambaugh (2014).
Additionally, fundamental finance theory suggests any “alpha” should be met with competitive
and aggressive arbitrage to immediately correct any asset mispricing resulting from the index
inclusion effect. Finally, Petajisto (2011) found a decreasing trend in the magnitude of the ARs
after a spike in the year 2000. This decline in the abnormal returns from the S&P 500 index
inclusion event is supported by Petal and Welch’s (2017) findings that the two-day
announcement effect has declined from approximately 4% in the 1990’s to about 2% in 2015.
Therefore, the expectation is for the impact of the event to continue to decrease. The ARs
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generated by the index inclusion events are predicted to continue to converge towards zero. As
the ARs from the index inclusion event approaches zero and significance wanes, it may be
concluded that the market is becoming more efficient. The hypotheses provided in H6 are
directional due to the differing addition and deletion experiences of the inclusion event. The H6
hypotheses for further addressing RQ1 and RQ2 are:


H6a: The annual CAARs (AD [-1, 0]) for the firms added in the index inclusion event
will decrease from 2000 through 2021.



H6b: The annual CAARs (AD [-1,0]) for the firms deleted in the index inclusion event
will increase from 2000 through 2021.
Three sets of hypotheses (H6, H7, and H8) are examined for exploring RQ2: How do

ETFs influence underlying assets’ markets within the index inclusion event? For exploring
ETFs’ effect in the most basic sense, the yearly index inclusion effect calculated to test H6 also
informs RQ2. For examining “how” ETFs influence underlying assets’ markets, new IVs are
adopted, changing the variables for regression analysis consistent with the conceptual model (see
Figure 8).
The formation of hypotheses seven and eight are consistent with the rationale provided in
hypothesis six. As passively managed ETFs have grown in the markets, it appears that there is a
decrease in “alpha” opportunities (Stambaugh, 2014), Scholes (1972) arbitrage removes known
pricing inefficiencies, and as prior research shows, there is a decreasing trend in the index
premium beginning in the year 2000 (Petajisto, 2011). However, this is only an observation and
includes five data points, ending in 2005. So, hypotheses and testing for a significant linear
relationship between the index inclusion event’s ARs and an increase in the use of ETFs, as
measured by ownership variables, were performed. The ETF ownership variables used for

43

regression analysis for inclusions throughout 1993-2000 are provided in Table 1. The ETF
ownership variables used for regression analysis for deletions over the period of 1993-2000 are
provided in Table 2. Next, the ETF ownership variables used for regression analysis for
inclusions and deletions over the period of 2001-2021 are provided in Table 3 and Table 4,
respectively. The tables provide the independent and correlating dependent variable used to
investigate ETF’s association with the index inclusion event’s impact on market efficiency.
The hypotheses provided in H7 and H8 are directional due to the inclusion event's
differing addition and deletion experiences. Additionally, H7 captures prior research’s known
AR growth, including the year 2000, while H8 captures the years after 2000. H7 will only have
two regressions per inclusion and deletion event. The H7 and H8 hypotheses for addressing the
second research question are organized and provided with tables that summarize the periods over
which their expected behavior is tested.
H7a: A positive linear relationship exists between ETFs’ growth and the annual CAARs
for the firms added in the index inclusion event from 1993 through 2000.
Table 1
Inclusion’s Variables for Regression Analysis for H7a (1993-2000)

R1

Variables
IV1/DV1

R2

IV2/DV2

Regression

Independent Variable
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
year (1993-2000)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
quarter (1993-2000)

Dependent Variable (AD -1, 0)
Annual inclusion CAARs (19932000)
Quarterly inclusion CAARs (19932000)

H7b: A negative linear relationship exists between ETFs’ growth and the annual CAARs
for the firms deleted in index inclusion events from 1993 through 2000.
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Table 2
Deletion’s Variables for Regression Analysis for H7b (1993-2000)
Regression

Variables

Independent Variable

R3

IV1/DV3

R4

IV2/DV4

S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by year (1993-2000)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by quarter (1993-2000)

Dependent Variable
(AD -1, 0)
Annual deletion
CAARs (1993-2000)
Quarterly deletion
CAARs (1993-2000)

H8a: A negative linear relationship exists between ETFs’ growth and the CARs/CAARs
for the firms added in the index inclusion event after 2000.
Table 3
Inclusion’s Variables for Regression Analysis for H8a (1993-2021)
Regression

Variables

Independent Variable

Dependent Variable (AD -1, 0)

R5

IV3/DV5

R6

IV4/DV6

R7

IV5/DV7

R8

IV6/DV8

R9

IV7/DV9

R10

IV8/DV10

R11

IV9/DV11

R12

IV10/DV12

R13

IV11/DV13

Annual inclusion CAARs
(2001-2010)
Quarterly inclusion CAARs
(2001-2010)
Annual inclusion CAARs
(2011-2021)
Quarterly inclusion CAARs
(2011-2021)
Annual inclusion CAARs
(2000-2021)
Quarterly inclusion CAARs
(2000-2021)
Annual inclusion CAARs
(1993-2021)
Quarterly inclusion CAARs
(1993-2021)
Quarterly inclusion CAARs
(2017-2021)

R14

IV12/DV14

S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
year (2001-2010)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
quarter (2001-2010)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
year (2011-2021)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
quarter (2011-2021)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
year (2000-2021)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
quarter (2000-2021)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
year (1993-2021)
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap by
quarter (1993-2021)
S&P 500 ETFs (top 3) change in
included firms’ ownership by
quarter (2017-2021)
S&P 500 ETFs (top 3) change in
included firms’ ownership by
month (by event) (2017-2021)

Monthly (by event) inclusion CARs
(2017-2021)

H8b: A positive linear relationship exists between ETFs’ growth and the CARs/CAARs
for the firms deleted in the index inclusion event after 2000.
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Table 4
Deletion’s Variables for Regression Analysis for H8b (1993-2021)
Regression
R15
R16
R17
R18
R19
R20
R21
R22
R23
R24

Variables
IV3/DV15

Independent Variable
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by year (2001-2010)
IV4/DV16
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by quarter (2001-2010)
IV5/DV17
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by year (2011-2021)
IV6/DV18
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by quarter (2011-2021)
IV7/DV19
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by year (2000-2021)
IV8/DV20
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by quarter (2000-2021)
IV9/DV21
S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by year (1993-2021)
IV10/DV22 S&P 500 % ETF Market Cap
by quarter (1993-2021)
IV13/DV23 S&P 500 ETFs (top 3) change
in deleted firms’ ownership by
quarter (2017-2021)
IV14/DV24 S&P 500 ETFs (top 3) change
in deleted firms’ ownership by
month (by event) (2017-2021)

Dependent Variable (AD -1, 0)
Annual deletion CAARs
(2001-2010)
Quarterly deletion CAARs
(2001-2010)
Annual deletion CAARs
(2011-2021)
Quarterly deletion CAARs
(2011-2021)
Annual deletion CAARs
(2000-2021)
Quarterly deletion CAARs
(2000-2021)
Annual deletion CAARs
(1993-2021)
Quarterly deletion CAARs
(1993-2021)
Quarterly deletion CAARs
(2017-2021)
Monthly (by event) deletion CARs
(2017-2021)

Specific ETF trading behavior of the underlying assets during the index inclusion event
window is explored for addressing RQ3. This part of the study indirectly investigates replication
strategy by leveraging a physical full replicating passively managed S&P 500 index-tracking
ETF and a physical partially replicating S&P 500 ETF. The ETFs trading patterns are observed
for understanding how these ETFs participate in the index inclusion event. The physical full
replicating ETF for this research is the SPY, and as of September 2021, it is the largest ETF with
$403.65 billion in AUM (ETFdb.com, 2021). The physically partially replicating ETF for this
research is the IVV, and as of September 2021, it is the second largest ETF with $305.56 billion
in AUM (ETFdb.com, 2021).
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Of specific interest for this research is the flexibility partial replication affords an ETF.
Partial replication allows for the optimization of returns by timing the trading and selection of
securities that may not align with the tracking of its benchmark index. According to Madhavan
(2016), partially replicating ETFs may choose to trade tracking error for returns (p. 64). The
returns, in this case, would be secured by the IVV ETF following a different trading scheme
within the index inclusion event than the SPY ETF. Or, put differently, the IVV ETF’s flexibility
will result in a different response from that expected by the SPY ETF when assets are added or
deleted from the index they track.
Consistent with finance theory, when an NFD(S) shock introduces an opportunity for
risk-free profits, arbitrage should occur, removing the mispricing. In this case, the index
inclusion effect provides an opportunity for investors to secure such profits. Additionally, as
noted in prior research, physical partially replicating ETFs have the freedom to trade tracking
error for various factors such as inclusion events (Madhavan, 2016, p. 64) where physical full
replication may not (Blume & Edelen, 2004). Therefore, the H9 hypotheses for addressing RQ3
are:


H9a: The IVV will buy included firms’ stocks at a lower price than SPY.



H9b: The IVV will sell deleted firms’ stocks at a higher price than SPY.

Significance of the Study
This research addresses several gaps and contributes to the literature in finance and
economics in numerous ways. The gaps and subsequent contributions to literature are in two
general areas. The first area is indexing’s continued effect on underlying assets’ markets’ ability
to price during the index inclusion effect. The second area this research addresses is the gap in
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the literature around ETF’s influence during the critical purchase and sale of underlying assets
across the index inclusion event window.
The extension of the index inclusion effect documents the S&P 500 index’s current
premium as measured by the event studies. If, as expected, the index inclusion effect still exists,
then this study provides additional support for indexing’s premium. Next, by extending the
investigation into the index inclusion effect, current insights for the markets’ theoretical
efficiency are established. By establishing the index inclusion effect’s record through 2021, this
research will further the understanding of the current efficiency of our markets by enabling a
comparison of these findings with those of the past. As different indexing products have
increased market share, it may be the case that other fund structures, like the ETF, are
responsible for the changing index premium, altering markets’ efficiency. Additionally, the
investigation into the index inclusion effect verifies the EMH by successfully executing
additional event studies.
This study is the first to explore the relationship between ETFs and their effect on
underlying assets during the index inclusion event window. By studying ETFs’ participation
during the fund’s critical purchase and sale of underlying assets, this research takes an initial step
toward addressing if the growth in ETFs is related to the markets’ efficiency by studying the
change in the indexing premium. This research furthers knowledge into the effects of ETFs on
their underlying assets by examining ETF participation during the index inclusion event window.
Finally, using daily holding volume data from FactSet’s ETF Datafeed, this study examines
specific ETFs’ flexibility related to an ETF’s performance and returns. The study is original and
will provide investors and academics with unique knowledge about ETFs and the state of the
index inclusion effect.
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CHAPTER 3 – METHODOLOGY
This chapter describes the models, methods, design, measures, and processes used to
discover, collect, and analyze data for addressing the research questions. The research includes
multiple methods for examining ETFs’ effect on their underlying assets within the index
inclusion event. The event study method is used to extend the S&P 500’s index inclusion effect
research. The hypotheses are tested by the event study method, regression analysis, and an
original price discovery method. Additionally, an independent t-test is applied to compare results
for investigating specific ETFs’ participation in the index inclusion event.
The first portion of this research leverages a study originated by Shleifer (1986) and
separately by Harris and Gurel (1986) and extends the S&P 500 index inclusion event data from
where Petajisto (2011) ended. The event study method is briefly explained, followed by design
details of this research’s event studies, including reviewing the steps for securing the samples
(underlying assets) and the data collection process. Next are the measures and data section for
the event study portion of the research, followed by a walkthrough of the event studies’ process,
from data collection to data analysis. After the abnormal returns are generated from the event
study, hypotheses H1 through H5 are examined. Regression tests are identified for the
examination of hypotheses H7 and H8. Finally, the price discovery method behind analyzing
ETFs' participation and influence in the index inclusion effect are discussed and the approach,
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data, and measures for analyzing the specific ETFs are reviewed. This chapter concludes with the
independent t-test for examining hypotheses H9 addressing the third research question.
Conceptual Model
The study has one basic conceptual model for addressing the research questions and is
provided in Figure 8. The model (Figure 8) is a simple main effect relationship derived from
basic supply and demand curves illustrating the relationship between quantity (volume) and
price. The model identifies the relationship between the NFD(S) shock (volume) from indexing’s
inclusion (deletion) event on an underlying assets’ returns (price). Closing prices are converted
and adjusted to the firm’s returns for evaluating the market’s ability to price an asset. The
market’s ability to price assets will be measured by the abnormal returns (ARs) experienced from
the index inclusion event, as calculated by an event study. For this research, the ARs indicate the
market’s inability to accurately price the underlying assets and measure the experienced
economic event's size and direction.
Figure 8
Conceptual Model Index Inclusion Event

Although the model is consistent throughout the research, various independent variables
(IVs) and dependent variables (DVs) are used for testing the hypotheses which inform the
research questions for this study. As the study moves to the second research question and
introduces ETFs’ participation in the index inclusion effect, the independent variable is more
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precisely defined. Additionally, the DV selected for measuring underlying assets’ market pricing
are examined using abnormal returns (AR) experienced from the index inclusion event, as
calculated by the event study. Finally, the ETF’s costs and prices are calculated using a modified
price discovery method that follows this same general financial model.
Event Study Method Overview
The event study method is nearly 100 years old, introduced in 1933 by James Dolley
(Mackinlay, 1997). It has evolved over that time, providing endless insights for many disciplines.
The event study method offers a framework for observing an event's economic impact on a
firm’s value.
This event study attempts to build on prior researchers’ event studies documenting
inclusion events, commonly referred to as the index inclusion event. This research picks up
Petajisto’s (2011) event studies and continues the chronological progression, extending from
where Petajisto ended in 2005 and covering through 2021. This study will bring the S&P 500
index inclusion event’s history up to date.
This research design focuses on detecting an NFD(S) shock brought about by a change in
the S&P 500 constituents. The hypotheses are informed by relying on prior research findings,
which show that, historically, ARs are observed for this event. The ARs will then be leveraged
for investigating the research question through various hypotheses.
The event study method's ability to measure the economic impact from a specific event
depends on three basic assumptions: efficient markets, unanticipated events, and no confounding
variables (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). For an event study to demonstrate an abnormal response
to an event, the market in which the firm’s stock is traded must be efficient for modeling an
anticipated “expected” return. By selecting the S&P 500 index, the largest domestic firms’ equity

51

markets, the most mature and efficient markets available are used for this research. Additionally,
the U.S. largest firms’ stock markets are where the EMH has consistently been validated through
countless event studies. Therefore, selecting the S&P 500 index aligns with the first assumption
for an effective event study.
For best results, the event should be unanticipated. The S&P 500 is an S&P Global index
under the management of an S&P Global committee. The committee evaluates firms for
representing the U.S. economy and against specific publicly available criteria for consideration
for inclusion in the index. The dynamic index’s asset changes, when made, are announced via a
press release at the end of the business day. The change's AD is unknown and, even with
analysis, difficult to predict. The “announcement” of the changes (addition and deletion) is
unanticipated, fulfilling the second assumption required for the event study method. This
research also investigates when an asset is effectively included (deleted) in (from) the index. The
ID (DD) is the date the index includes (removes) the new (old) asset in the calculation of the
index. Passively managed funds that closely replicate the index will begin trading the underlying
assets around the index’s announced changes. The ID/DD is most often revealed within the AD
press release. This makes the ID/DD known to the market, therefore challenging the second
assumption for an effective event study.
An essential step in any event study is examining the selected event window for material
confounding events (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). This effort used S&P Global press releases
for examining sample firms for potential confounding events in the event window. It is the case
that most of the S&P 500 index changes result from M&A or divesting. The event study analysis
requires sufficient data prior to, through, and past the event for modeling (if using an estimation
window) and calculating ARs (event window). These event study requirements organically
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remove the confounded samples (firms) impacted by M&A and divesting from this analysis. This
natural elimination appreciably addresses the third assumption for performing an event study.
The Event Studies’ Detailed Design
The event studies’ specific designs are essential for its success, and this study generally
follows the studies designed by Shleifer (1986), Harris and Gurel (1986), and Petajisto (2011).
The detailed design explains the event and establishes the sample firms' selection for inclusion in
the event studies. Then a brief explanation is provided for the event study and its essential
variables: the event’s event dates, the selection of the event window length, determining the
estimation window length, and the model selection.
The index inclusion event. This research studies the index inclusion effect using stock
market data from 1993 through 2021, updating prior research’s findings of ARs created by
market mispricing. Specifically, this research analyzes inclusions and deletions events from the
S&P 500 index for ARs. The research’s events are set across two dimensions. The first
dimension is the two inclusion events of interest: when an index “announces” an underlying asset
change; and when an index “includes” the asset and effectively changes its composition. The
second dimension captures whether the change is an “addition” to the index or a “deletion.”
Although there is one S&P 500 announcement, two separate firms are impacted—the
included and deleted firms—forming two distinct events. So, to address the research question,
two events capturing the index inclusion effect are designed. An inclusion event for an index
either requires a deletion or is the result of deletion. For example, the S&P 500 committee may
determine that the index could better represent the U.S. economy with a particular firm’s stock
and include it in the index. This decision requires that a firm be deleted. Additionally, when a
firm in the S&P 500 merges with another S&P 500 firm, effectively deleting one of the index
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firms, a new inclusion is required. Regardless of the sequence, index inclusion events typically
involve an underlying asset deletion.
As described by the event window discussion, two events are studied by this and prior
research for testing the markets’ ability to price assets consistent with financial theory. The first
event occurs on the AD. This event is purported to be an information-less announcement. For
this research, it is considered an NFD shock for the firm being added and simultaneously a nonfundamental supply (NFS) shock for the firm being deleted. The next event occurs on the
ID/DD, often included in the press release or announcement, and is the date the index will begin
calculating with the new index composition. The ID/DD event is also considered informationless and is known. For these reasons, on the days surrounding the inclusion event, no abnormal
returns should be observed. The events AD and ID/DD occur, on average, within five days of
one another. However, each event has a variable event window which is included in one large
event window. Therefore, this index inclusion event study is viewed through one larger event
window for the two events.
Sample selection. Although prior research shows that the index inclusion effect is not
unique to the S&P 500, this study examines the continuation of the index inclusion effect for the
S&P 500. The S&P 500 committee selects the firm for inclusion and deletion, which then
experiences an NFD(S) shock. The potential sample firms used for investigating the continuation
of the index inclusion effect for the S&P 500 include all the firms added (deleted) to (from) the
S&P 500 over the period which ETFs have been in domestic financial markets—from 1993
through 2021. This study considered 724 inclusions, and after examination of available data
provided by FactSet, 607 events remained and were used for investigating hypotheses and
creating CAARs for regression analysis. The 607 remaining firms are referred to as Clean Firms
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for the purposes of this research. Finally, 101 samples were included in the price discovery, all of
this is summarized in Table 5.
Table 5
Sample Selection for S&P 500 Index Inclusion Events 1993-2021
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
1993-2000
2001-2010
2011-2021
Total

Sample Firms
13
17
29
21
25
41
41
57
28
23
9
19
18
31
38
38
25
17
20
18
18
15
30
27
28
23
20
17
18
244
246
234
724

Clean Firms
7
12
20
18
20
36
35
48
25
20
8
15
17
23
33
37
21
15
16
14
14
12
19
26
27
23
16
13
17
196
214
197
607
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Price Discovery
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
6
26
23
16
13
17
0
0
101
101

For this study, 719 deletions were considered as a total of 719 firms have been removed
from the S&P 500 index over the period from 1993 to 2021. After examination of available data
provided by FactSet, 275 firms were available and included in event studies for testing
hypotheses and generating CAARs for regression analysis. The 275 remaining firms are referred
to as Clean Firms for the purposes of this research. Additionally, 58 firms were included in the
price discovery analysis, all this is summarized in Table 6. The reason for the five additional
inclusions stems from a January 2015 decision by the S&P 500 Index Committee to add an
additional class of stock for some firms.
Table 6
Sample Selection for S&P 500 Index Deletion Events 1993-2021
Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016

Sample Firms
13
17
29
21
25
41
41
57
28
23
9
19
18
31
38
38
25
17
20
18
18
15
30
27

Clean Firms
6
8
11
11
5
7
9
25
11
13
2
7
4
10
11
14
13
6
8
6
7
8
8
9
56

Price Discovery
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3

Table 6
Sample Selection for S&P 500 Index Deletion Events 1993-2021
Year
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
1993-2000
2001-2010
2011-2021
Total

Sample Firms
28
23
20
17
18
244
246
229
719

Clean Firms
15
7
11
11
12
82
91
102
275

Price Discovery
14
7
11
11
12
0
0
58
58

Consistent with Petajisto (2011), firms were removed from the study if the impacted
sample firm’s pricing data, required to perform the event study, was not available. The loss of
pricing data impacts the number of available inclusion and deletion sample firms for this event
study. The availability of data for inclusions and deletions when experiencing an M&A or
divestiture effect the available sample firms for each type of event differently. It is most often the
case that M&A presents a situation where the consumed or deleted firm is without data following
an event. Therefore, leaving more inclusions over the evaluated period than deletions. Although
the market-adjusted method does not require a robust estimation window, the validation of the
results through using the four-factor model does. Therefore, for achieving a quality comparison
and validation, selection of the sample firms for inclusions and deletions included more than
Petajisto’s 15 days of data proceeding an event (Petajisto, 2001). The total required pricing data
for performing this event study is explained in the subsequent Event Window and Estimation
Window subsections. So, firms under major confounding events which exclude pricing data,
were eliminated from this research as FactSet does not provide adequate data for evaluating
those firms. A list of the samples (firms) used for this research are included in Tables 5 and 6.
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The event study. This event study determines if an anticipated NFD(S) and then later, an
actual NFD(S) shock generates a significant, measurable economic impact on a firm. The event's
significance is measured by a test of differences using a parametric t-test. Expected returns
within an event window are modeled by regressing markets’ with firms’ returns in an estimation
window. The expected return is then subtracted from the actual return to provide the abnormal
return for any given firm and date within the event window. Before diving into each component
of the event study, a visual using the simple market model is provided in Figure 9.
Figure 9
Timeline for the Event Study

Event dates. The event is communicated to the markets across two separate event dates,
the index “announcement” and “inclusion” of a firm in the index calculation. The
“announcement” date (AD) is determined by S&P Global’s press release announcing firms’
addition and deletion. This study's AD is defined by the date after S&P Global issues a press
release for the composition change of the S&P 500 index. The next trading day is selected as the
announcement is performed after the market closes on the press release day. So, for this research
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the announcement event or AD is the S&P Global press release date (PR) plus one day. As
previously discussed, the announcement sends a signal to the market, but it does not provide any
information for asset pricing. The ID/DD is the day when the index calculates valuation using the
new stock in its composition and is communicated in S&P Global’s press release. The ID/DD is
another non-fundamental demand (supply) shock known to the investment community before the
event date, so it should not experience ARs for two reasons (NFD(S) shock and known event).
Event window. Establishing the event window's length is perhaps the most critical
design issue for event study research (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). The announcement and
inclusion dates are used for establishing the event window length for this study. Abnormal
returns before and after the announcement and inclusion dates are expected to occur and justify
extending the event window in both directions. The length of the extension aligns with prior
research (Petajisto, 2011) and was carefully considered for avoiding reducing the power of the
test statistic and increasing the probability of confounds (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).
This research generally follows Petajisto (2011) in that two events, the announcement
and the inclusion events, are combined in one event window. The events’ dates are described in
the press release, and typically the inclusion trails the announcement by five days. Therefore, for
viewing the total event window the ID/DD will be centered on day zero, and the AD, on average,
will be from day zero to day minus four. Starting with this event window design, three distinct
areas of the event window are created and are analyzed. Figure 7 illustrates the three separate
parts of the event window which established five hypotheses which are individually tested.
Variable event windows are introduced when combining the AD and the ID (or
separately the DD) into one event window (see Figure 7). The period from the AD to the ID/DD
is the “Event” portion of the event window. For testing the hypotheses, the CAARs for the events
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that do not fit the five-day scenario were dropped from the analysis. This means that fewer
samples (N) will be used for informing this portion of the research. Additionally, graphically
presenting the event window (viewing the CAARs) for the inclusion and separately the deletion
events, that do not complete between the AD and ID/DD events, will not be included in the
analysis. The duration of the “Event” part of the event window is five days. A specific event
study, using all the available samples is designed for testing H2a and H2b with findings reported
in the Results section.
Assuming the five-day interval for the event portion of the event window, six days before
the press release will set the leading edge of the event window at ten days before the ID/DD (-10
days). The additional six days will be used for capturing any leaks by the S&P Global committee
before the press release identifies the AD and ID/DD. The period from the AD, including the PR
day, forms the “Pre-event” portion of the event window. For testing the hypotheses (H1a and
H1b), the CAARs for all of the available events are used for informing this portion of the
research. The duration of the “Pre-event” part of the event window is six days, from day minus
five to day minus ten. A specific event study is designed for testing H1a and H1b with findings
reported in the Results section.
Ten days after the inclusion date (day 0) will be the trailing edge (10 days), over which
the time the market takes to digest the information will be measured. Any reversion of the
abnormal returns is detected in this portion of the event window. The anticipated reversion
confirms the non-fundamental demand (supply) nature of the event. The period from the ID/DD,
not including the ID/DD day, forms the “Post-event” portion of the event window. For testing
the hypotheses (H3a and H3b), the CAARs for all of the available events are used for informing
this portion of the research. The duration of the “Post-event” part of the event window is ten
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days, from day one to day ten. A specific event study is designed for testing H3a and H3b with
findings reported in the Results section.
To ensure we capture the whole event, the window will be, on average, 21 days. Again,
on average, because to the variable nature of the “Event” portion of the event window.
Additionally, the AD and ID/DD events are examined. For testing the hypotheses (H4a, H4b,
H5a, and H5b), the CAARs for all of the available events are used for informing this portion of
the research. The duration of the specific events are three days, from one day preceding to one
day after the observed event date. A specific event study is designed for testing H4a, H4b, H5a,
and H5b with findings reported in the Results section.
Estimation window. The estimation window holds the data used for modeling expected
returns within the event window to compare actual returns in the generation of abnormal returns.
The event studies’ estimation window design element has a few crucial features. This research’s
event studies will not overlap the estimation window with the event window to control for each
event’s expected and actual returns. The estimation window will end approximately twenty-five
days before the first day of the specific event’s event window for all event studies within this
research. There is an average of 252 trading days per year, and some studies find that seasonal
effects exist (Thaler, 1987a, 1987b; Zarowin, 1989), supporting one year of data for modeling
returns. However, to maximize the sample when using the Four-factor model, the estimation
window will be 120 days for this research.
Twenty-five additional days before and after the current event window will be reserved
for expanding the event window data for accommodating the “Event” portion of the event
window for this research. Additionally, the subsequent analysis may require additional days
before and after the current event window for regression or price discovery examination. The
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event studies’ gap between the event window and estimation window is flexible to ensure no
overlap of the estimation window with the event windows.
The Event Studies’ Data and Measures
Event study equations. The abnormal returns are aggregated over time, firm, and across
both elements to analyze the event thoroughly. The event study’s equations are provided by
EventStudyTools.com (Schimmer et al., 2014), and the naming convention follows their
structure for consistency and clarity.
Abnormal Returns (AR) are calculated by subtracting “expected” returns from “actual”
returns over the period of interest (event window). This calculation of ARs will be followed
when using for the Carhart model which represents the Fama French Three Factor model plus
Carhart’s momentum factor. However, the market-adjusted returns method is also used in this
research and directly generates excess or abnormal returns. Expected returns are modeled using
the following models:




The market adjusted model – 𝑅 = 𝑙𝑛

− 𝑙𝑛



Rⅈt = excess returns;



Sⅈt = adjusted stock return for stock ⅈ at time t;



Mt = adjusted market return for the market at time t

, 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒

(1)

Carhart Model –
𝑅 = 𝑟 + 𝛽 𝑟 − 𝑟 + 𝛽 (𝑆𝑀𝐵) + 𝛽 (𝐻𝑀𝐿) + 𝛽 (𝑈𝑀𝐷) + 𝜀 , 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒



𝑅 = 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑖 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑑 𝑡;



𝑟 = 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘 − 𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒;



𝛽 𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡;



𝑟 − 𝑟

= 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑚𝑖𝑢𝑚;
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(2)



𝑆𝑀𝐵 (𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑏𝑖𝑔) = 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑠𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝;



𝐻𝑀𝐿 (ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑤) = 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒;



𝑈𝑀𝐷 (𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑢𝑠 𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑠) = 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑚𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑢𝑚

Many models may be used for producing expected returns, including some more complex
models that may sharpen the model’s predictive capability. The models selected for the event
studies are the market-adjusted and Carhart’s four-factor model (Carhart, 1997). Even though
most factor-based models add little explanatory power (Mackinlay, 1997), the Carhart fourfactor model will also generate expected returns for verifying calculated results.
The market data source selection, Mt or rm, is an important consideration. A few broad
indices may be used for modeling the market portion of underlying assets’ returns. CRSP
market-value returns from Ken French’s website, derived from the three-factor model, are
selected for the broad market index for this research (Kenneth R. French—Data Library, 2022).
The CRSP market value-weighted index is perhaps the most used, and, therefore, the most
academically tested index of the available market options.
When modeling, typically, the daily market data is regressed with firm data over the
estimation window for revealing the βx and α used for calculating the expected returns over the
event window of interest. Then actual rm is input into the model with the specific (new) β and α
to generate expected returns over the event window. Next, the expected returns are subtracted
from the actual returns arriving at the ARs for each day of the event window; see equations (3a
and 3b) and Figure 10.
𝐴𝑅 = (𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 (𝑅) )

(3a)

𝐴𝑅 = (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 ) − (𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑠 (𝑅) )

(3b)

The ARs are aggregated across time, firm, and both leading to inferences for the events
under study, which are used for addressing the hypotheses and research question. Aggregation
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across firms, cross-sectionally for the multiple micro-events, is performed for sampling the
event’s effect across many different firms. This aggregation is the Average Abnormal Return
(AAR); see equation (4).
∑

𝐴𝐴𝑅 =

(4)

𝐴𝑅 ,

Aggregation is also completed across time per firm. For measuring the firm's total impact
over the event window, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) are aggregated over days; see
equation (5).
𝐶𝐴𝑅 = ∑

(5)

𝐴𝑅 ,

Finally, aggregation is completed across the firm and time. This value condenses the total
averages of the event into one aggregated total. The Cumulative Average Abnormal Return
(CAAR) measures the total impact experienced for the event; see equation (6).
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅 = ∑

(6)

𝐶𝐴𝑅

The statistical significance of the AR, AAR, CAR, and CAAR is calculated at each step
along the analysis path. The calculation process is similar whether determining the statistical
significance of sample firms across each day of the event window or whether abnormal returns
are in various aggregated states. The expected, or null hypothesis, H 0, is that the AR, AAR,
CAR, and CAAR is nearly 0. With the assumption that the distribution of the sample ARs for
any observation or aggregated return (AR, AAR, CAR, CAAR) in the event window is
approximately normal:
(𝑋)𝐴𝑅 ~ 𝑁(0, 𝜎 (𝑋)𝐴𝑅

)

(7)

A test statistic may be constructed at each step for determining the significance of the
abnormal value. The test statistic and its standard deviation (σ) equation construction do get a bit
more complicated with various levels of aggregation; the formulas for the test statistics are:
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For ARs, at each point in time, t and σ = standard deviation:
𝑡



,

(8)

(9)

= √𝑁

For the CAR, at time, t and σ = standard deviation:
𝑡



=

For the cross-sectional test AAR, at time, t and σ = standard deviation:
𝑡



,

=

(10)

For the CAAR, is provided by the following, with σ = standard deviation:
𝑡

= √𝑁

(11)

Validity. The event study framework compares modeled returns (expected) with actual
returns, resulting in a measurement of differences referred to as “abnormal returns” (AR). The
size of the difference is then examined to determine the statistical significance of the event under
investigation.
Internal validity is sound, built-in to the event study method due to the paired nature of
the test in differences of the data. The event study method compares a modeled “expected”
statistic with the “actual” value at the same point in time – the return experienced over a single
day. The event study method has substantial internal validity as it compares a firm to a modeled
version of itself at the same point in time.
Another internal validity concern is the influence events may have on the research if the
estimation window and the event window overlap. To ensure the modeled, expected returns are
not impacted by the event under investigation, this research will not overlap the estimation and
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event windows. The estimation window will end an estimated twenty-five days before the start
of the event window for all of the events studied in this research.
External validity is a different story, primarily due to the presence of confounding events.
Confounding variables may make the data over the event window unusable. For example, if an
earnings notice is made in the event window, the index inclusion event's abnormal returns may
be from the earnings, not the index’s announcement. This research will use a confounding
variable search process reflective of a process summarized by McWilliams and Siegel (1997) for
ensuring that the event under study is the event driving the detected abnormal returns. The
confounding nature of events is the most critical and often overlooked external issue in an event
study, for which a solid event study design can successfully mitigate (McWilliams & Siegel,
1997). The confounding events' mitigation addresses most of the external validity concerns with
the method and specific research.
Level of analysis. The analysis for this research is primarily at the firm level. All data
observed, collected, and analyzed for this research are studied and discussed at the firm level.
The firm pricing, returns, abnormal returns, and NFD(S) volume shocks are economic values
about an underlying asset or the firm – all at the same level of analysis. However, the findings do
inform and are leveraged to address what is occurring at the portfolio or the ETF level.
Data. Some descriptions of the data used for the event studies for this research include
addressing the data’s duration, sources, and type. This is followed by a brief explanation of how
the data are used. The data’s duration or frequency is daily. The daily returns or closing prices,
for modeling, actual, and the events under study, are based on daily frequency. FactSet provides
all the asset closing prices for the event studies. FactSet’s Excel plug-in is exclusively used to
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bring in FactSet's accurate and managed data for analysis by EST.com. Finally, the type of data
used in this research’s event studies is historical, secondary data.
The data under analysis for this research are the adjusted closing prices for the underlying
assets and the market. This event study uses adjusted closing prices for firms for all the events
under investigation. FactSet provides firms’ historical adjusted closing price data for all the
samples (firms) for each event study. FactSet offers many options for closing prices and returns,
so the specific “Data Item” selected for performing this research is the P_Price option which uses
a firm’s closing prices adjusted for spins, splits, and dividends. Again, French’s website provides
the adjusted closing prices from the CRSP database, backed out from the Fama-French threefactor model for the market inputs for the entire duration of the event study, including the
estimation window, which is used to calculate “expected” returns when using the Carhart fourfactor model.
Using data adjusted for corporate actions is critical for accurately measuring a firm’s
economic performance. If the studies under research omitted the distribution component of
returns, it may inappropriately report an event and find an event significant, leading to a Type I
error (Madhavan, 2016, p. 64; Mackinlay, 1997). Additionally, this oversight may skew other
measures, specifically the volatility measurements, making the relationships between the
modeled and real data seem greater than actual.
The Event Studies’ Process and EventStudyTools.com
The event studies for this research are guided by Petajisto (2011) and informed by the
frameworks established by MacKinlay (1997) and McWilliams and Siegel (1997) on event
studies. Designing and executing an event study for measuring an event’s economic effect on a
firm ensures the study provides reliable results for accurately addressing the research’s
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questions. The first event study, established to address H1a and H1b, is stepped through for
demonstrating this study’s event study process.
The process referenced will be used for addressing both events (inclusion and deletion)
across the event window under investigation. The inclusions and the deletions are separately
grouped when executing the analysis for the event study but are combined for forming a picture
of the entire event window, as shown in the Results section. The S&P 500 index selection
committee identified the specific sample firms for this study; see Tables 5 and 6. Additionally,
firms’ event dates for the announcement and inclusion have been established by S&P’s press
release. After confirming the dates for events from 1993 to 2021, the event dates and ranges for
the estimation window and event windows are set for each measurable, hypothesized event
across the event window.
EventStudyTools.com (EST) (Schimmer et al., 2014) is used for performing the event
study analysis. The results and conclusion sections will compare and contrast analysis for all the
events studied to support this research. The results will inform hypotheses H1, H2, H3, H4, H5,
and H6 in support of RQ1 and RQ2. Further, the CAARs/CARs are utilized for creating DVs for
testing hypotheses H7 and H8, further addressing RQ2. Additionally, the event studies’ windows
are leveraged for designing the price discovery method which focuses on H9 addressing RQ3.
Regression Analysis
Regression analysis was used for confirming H6 and investigating H7 and H8, addressing
RQ2. Regression analysis tested for the significance of the relationship of ETFs with market
inefficiencies from the index inclusion event (CAARs/CARs). As tested in the event studies, the
main effect stems from the NFD(S) volume shocks. The volume shocks are, in part, due to
passive ETFs purchasing and selling large blocks of underlying assets’ stocks. Therefore,
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ownership of the underlying assets by ETFs, using shares outstanding or market cap variables
will represent the IVs on which the DVs (CAARs/CARs) will be regressed.
The IVs are derived from the S&P 500 index and are inspired by Ben-David et al. (2017)
and their Figure “Time Series of the Total Market Capitalization and the Assets Under
Management of ETFs” (p. 31). The percent ETF market cap of the S&P 500 IV is derived by
taking the total market cap of the S&P 500 index and calculating the proportion of the top three
S&P 500 market cap weighted ETFs’ market cap. The top three ETFs (SPY, IVV, and VOO)
were chosen as they make up approximately 80% of AUM for all ETFs which participate in
tracking the S&P 500 index (ETF.com, 2021). Although the S&P 500 makes up an
overwhelming portion of the total market cap, the constructed IV is a little different in size and
by percent ETF market cap. Figure 10 shows the S&P 500 index market cap, the top 3 S&P 500
ETFs (SPY, IVV, and VOO) market cap, and the percent ETF of S&P 500 market cap over the
years 1993 through 2021, the years that ETFs have part of the U.S. stock markets.
Figure 10
Time Series of the S&P 500 Market Cap and Percent ETF of Total Market Cap
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Fourteen IVs, representing various ETF ownership of holdings (stocks), and 24 DVs,
representing various abnormal returns (CAARs/CARs), determined by the event studies, are
analyzed in 24 separate regressions. Twelve regressions will be performed for analyzing the
inclusion events and twelve for examining the deletion events. The DVs (underlying assets’
CAARs/CARs) are regressed independently on each of the IVs for determining the magnitude
and significance of their correlation. In all the regression analyses, the DV’s average values will
be adjusted to match the time frame of the IV’s measures (monthly (by event), quarterly, and
yearly). The general linear regression equation for this analysis is:
𝐷𝑉 = 𝛽 ∗ 𝐼𝑉 + α


𝛽 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑙𝑜𝑝𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝;



𝛼 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝

(12)

The first ten IVs for this analysis, used for both the inclusions and deletions, are derived
from FactSet data and are based on the S&P 500 total market cap and the market cap of the top
three S&P 500 ETFs (SPY, IVV, and VOO). The last four IVs are uniquely derived based on the
specific included or deleted firms from the S&P 500 over the period 2017 to 2021. The four IVs
(IV 11, 12, 13, and 14) use FactSet’s ETF ownership data providing the specific events’
quarterly and monthly percent ETF ownership of shares outstanding. The monthly (by event),
quarterly, and yearly change in ownership of the S&P 500 focused on the three largest ETFs
tracking the S&P 500, due to their overwhelming size.
For addressing H7a and H7b, the first two IVs, IV1 and IV2, are developed from the
percent ETF market cap of the S&P 500 as depicted in Figure 10. The IVs are derived from the
ETF percentage of market cap (ownership) of the S&P 500. Underlying assets’ CAARs by year
and quarter will be regressed on ETFs’ percentage of S&P 500 ownership by year and quarter for
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determining the significance and strength of the relationship between ETFs and the index
inclusion event’s CAARs over time. As seen in Figure12, ETFs’ ownership of U.S. stocks and of
the S&P 500, respectively, have increased over the years. Additionally, Petajisto (2011) observes
the index premium (based on abnormal returns) declining in magnitude after peaking in 2000.
Therefore, for testing H7a (Inclusions) and H7b (Deletions), the first two IVs and first four DVs
are regressed covering 1993 to 2000, the early years of ETFs trading in the markets. Again, this
regression analysis is conducted by year and by quarter.
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑆&𝑃 500 % 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝) + α
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑆&𝑃 500 % 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝) + α

(13)
(14)

The second regression similarly covers the period of 1993 to 2000; however, the analysis
is conducted by quarter. Additionally, to complete the analysis for the period the regressions are
conducted for the deletions with the appropriate deletion CAARs generated from the event
studies. The regressions and the variables described and used to address H7a and H7b are
provided in Section 2 in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.
Next, for addressing H8a and H8b, IV3 through IV14 and DV5 through DV24 are
regressed for examining the linear relationship of the growth of ETF ownership of the S&P 500
and the observed abnormal returns over the same period (CAARs/CARs) post 2000. IV3 through
IV10 are analyzing different periods (decades) of ETF ownership of the S&P 500 with the
corresponding abnormal returns generated from the event studies. As previously discussed, the
final four IVs (IV11, IV12, IV13, and IV14) remain focused on the top three ETFs’ ownership of
the S&P 500 but derived from the specific firms involved in the event. IV11 and IV13 are
uniquely generated from the percent outstanding shares owned by the top three S&P 500 ETFs in
the quarter of the inclusion (IV11) or deletion (IV13). The same methodology is executed by
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month, which allows the analysis to be performed by event (IV12–inclusion and IV14–deletion).
When obtaining the granularity to investigate by month the DV can be aligned moving the
abnormal return to the CAR (DV22 and DV24) versus the CAAR. Equations (13) and (14) will
be leveraged for regression analysis over the period 2000 through 2021 testing H8a and H8b
addressing RQ2. The remaining four regressions, which also test H8 and contribute to assessing
RQ2, focus on a more granular linear regression analysis in the later years. Due to FactSet’s data
limitations, IV11, IV12, IV13, and IV14 will only cover the period of 2017 through 2021. The
final four regressions are inclusion and deletion instances of equations 15 and 16.
𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑜𝑝 3 𝑆&𝑃 500 𝐸𝑇𝐹𝑠 𝑐𝑢𝑚 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑜𝑓 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + α
𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 (𝑏𝑦 𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑡) 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑠 = 𝛽 ∗ (𝑇𝑜𝑝 3 𝑆&𝑃 500 𝐸𝑇𝐹 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑓𝑖𝑟𝑚𝑠 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘) + α

(15)
(16)

The regressions described above cover the period of 1993 to 2021 focusing on 2001 to
2021, with analysis conducted by month (by event), by quarter and by year. H8a is tested and
informed by the regression summary provided in Table 3. The table includes the regressions and
variables used for the analysis.
Additionally, to complete the analysis for RQ2, the regressions are conducted for the
deletions with the appropriate deletion CAARs generated from the event studies. In total, 24
regressions are executed for examining the linear relationship between growing ETF
participation in the U.S. markets, specifically the S&P 500 and the declining impact of the S&P
500’s index inclusion effect over time. The regressions and the variables described and used to
address H8b are provided in Table 4.
The results and conclusion sections examine and discuss the analysis from regressions for
this study. The results are used for confirming H6 and testing hypotheses H7 and H8 for
addressing RQ2. The regression analysis provides insight into the relationship between passively
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managed index-tracking ETFs and underlying assets’ markets through the study of the abnormal
returns observed from the index inclusion effect.
Price Discovery and Difference in Means Testing
This part of the research focuses on how individual ETFs participate in the index
inclusion event. Differences may be observed by concentrating on how each ETF trades its
underlying assets within the index inclusion event. Price discovery and an independent t-test will
determine the results for the H9 hypotheses addressing RQ3. An independent t-test will be
executed, and the significance of the findings used for evaluating the hypotheses. Using data
from FactSet’s ETF Datafeed, the two most significant ETF’s (SPY and IVV) trading behavior
throughout the S&P 500 index inclusion event window is analyzed.
As established in Chapter 2, ETFs are diverse, and some funds enjoy greater flexibility
than others. Within the S&P 500 ETF indexing funds, two giants, similar in many ways, vary in
one interestingly vital way: replication strategy. This research explores this difference.
The price discovery. Since price discovery is closely linked with the markets’ trading
process (Barclay & Hendershott, 2003), the weighted price contribution (WPC) price discovery
method was researched and chosen as a basis for creating a new measure for evaluating potential
differences in S&P 500 ETFs. WPC is a price discovery method used to study market-priced
assets' incremental price influence over a specified time. Researchers use it to learn how
competing effects of traders determine the amount and timing of price discovery over a defined
period (Barclay & Hendershott, 2003). Barclay and Hendershott (2003) employ the WPC with
Easley et al.’s (1997) information event model for measuring incremental information
contribution within their research. Following price discovery’s WPC, a similar technique was
developed for investigating ETF’s trading of their underlying assets. In the same vein of the
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weighted price contribution (WPC) methods used in many price discovery studies (Barclay &
Warner, 1993; Cao et al., 2000; Huang, 2002; and Barclay & Hendershott, 2003, 2004, 2008), a
method for measuring an ETF’s generated return is created.
Similarly, an ETF’s generated returns from an added or deleted stock may be calculated
from its trading of underlying assets over the index inclusion event window. The weighted return
generated (WRG) method measures the returns passively managed index-tracking ETFs generate
from trading underlying assets over the index inclusion event window. The WRG is calculated
for an ETF, like SPY or IVV. The foundational measure captures the ETF’s estimated daily
return from trading a specific underlying asset (firm’s stock). The WRG will then be aggregated
cross-sectionally for each sample firm added over the 2016 to 2021 sample period creating the
average WRG (AWRG). Each ETF’s AWRG for the inclusion (addition) event will be compared
to determine if they participate differently in the index inclusion event. Additionally, the entire
calculation process will be repeated for the deletion event.
The SPY and IVV ETF’s AWRG will be examined for testing H9, addressing RQ3. The
WRG method is used to calculate the measures for studying how an ETF’s goals determine
returns over the index inclusion event window. WRG measures the daily incremental returns
generated over the 21-day event window. For each holding UA, WRG is defined as:
𝑊𝑅𝐺

=∑

(

) ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛

(17)

where the change in volume UA is the ETF’s change in holding volume for a trading day for stock
UA, and Net Holdings UA is the ETF’s total change in holdings of stock UA accumulated
(disposed of) over the index inclusion event window. The second term is return UA which is the
Volume Weighted Average Price (VWAP) for the holding traded on the date of the transaction.
The VWAP is the estimated price of the holding an ETF realizes for acquiring (disposing of)
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stock UA on a day in the event window. The VWAP pricing is calculated using the natural log of
the change in prices over the event window periods. An ETF’s generated returns will be
measured over the index inclusion event window. The period of one day is the base increment
for this analysis, with an average of 21 days for each event window of index inclusion event.
Like the WPC statistic, WRG follows Fama and MacBeth (1973). The WRG is calculated for
each holding of an ETF that participated in the specific index inclusion event. Each ETF’s
samples’ WRG is equally weighted, and a mean WRG or the AWRG is calculated. The standard
deviation of the AWRG over the 101 sample firms is then used for measuring statistical
inference for the test of differences between SPY and IVV’s AWRG.
The two ETFs are expected to have different trading patterns over the event window. The
WRG price discovery method will calculate and measure the estimated returns generated by an
ETF as it enters and exits positions resulting from the index inclusion event. The SPY fully
replicates the S&P 500 and is expected to focus on its tracking error. The IVV is afforded the
flexibility to trade some tracking error for returns. Therefore, the IVV is anticipated to maximize
positive returns (or minimize losses) generated over the index inclusion event window.
Difference in means testing. The AWRG by ETF (SPY and IVV) over the event
window will be calculated and compared using independent t-tests for determining if the ETFs
participate in the index inclusion event in significantly different ways. The AWRG price
discovery and the test of differences are performed, and the analysis provided for addressing
RQ3. The independent test of differences compared the total AWRGs over the event window for
determining significance and confirming the price discovery results. The results were evaluated
for significance, determining if H9a and H9b can be supported, thus addressing RQ3. All price
discovery and test of differences results are reported in chapter four.
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CHAPTER 4 – RESULTS, ANALYSIS, FINDINGS, AND IMPLICATIONS
This chapter presents the results from the methods designed for addressing the
hypotheses and research questions for this study. The results are organized by research question
(RQ) and the supporting hypotheses designed and tested for addressing this research. The event
study results, focused on RQ1 and hypotheses H1 through H5, are provided first. The results for
the transitional hypotheses, H6a and H6b complete the analysis for RQ1 and begin analysis for
RQ2. The event studies of H6 are followed by the regression analysis, further addressing RQ2
with testing of H7 and H8. Finally, the price discovery results used for investigating RQ3 and
examining H9, will complete this study’s results.
Expected Index Inclusion Effect Behavior – Event Study Results
For addressing H1 through H5 and supporting our inquiry into RQ1, numerous event
studies were performed leveraging the online platform offered by www.eventstudytools.com
(Schimmer et al., 2014). With the focus on the S&P 500 index inclusions and deletions, two
macro event studies were designed for testing ten hypotheses addressing the state of the S&P 500
index inclusion event over the period in which ETFs have been available in U.S. markets. Two
event study methods were used to produce results: the market-adjusted method, and the FamaFrench Four-Factor model, also known as the Carhart Model. Each event study method was
conducted over two events (AD and ID/DD) within one, on average, 21-day event window. The
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event window is variable due to the number of days each micro event experiences between the
AD and ID/DD. Separate event studies were conducted for verifying and testing the specific
behavior of the index inclusion event over the 21-day window. H1 focused on the pre-event
portion of the event window and covered six days, -10 up to and including the PR day (day -5).
H2 concentrated on the event, which was variable in length as previously discussed. The event
portion of the event window was most frequently five days, beginning at the AD and ending at
the ID, day 0. The last part of the event window, covered by H3, was the post-event portion,
which was ten days, including days 1 to 10. Two additional hypotheses, H4 and H5 were created
for exploring the AD and ID/DD events, respectively. Although these hypotheses were created
for confirming expected behavior observed from prior research, the separate event studies for
testing the index inclusion event across the event window are unique. Twenty macro event
studies were performed for analyzing and confirming S&P 500’s index inclusion event over the
period in which ETFs have been part of the market. The event study results for the inclusions and
deletions are provided in Table 7 and 8, respectively.
The CAARs generated from the event studies have been graphed to provide a
visualization of the event window for this research. The CAARs are from both macro events –
inclusions and deletions. The first graph includes the adjusted CAARs, and the second graph
normalizes the CAARs to a maximum and minimum cumulative effect ranging from 1 to -1.
Both graphs address the variable “event” portion of the window with linear interpolation, similar
to Petajisto’s (2011) study. Linear interpolation of the CAARs is used to fit all event lengths into
the average five-day event interval. The linear interpolation method used for event lengths in
excess of five days or beyond day -4 was compressed into the five-day event window. The
event’s total CAARs were aggregated, appropriately averaged, and fitted into the five days of the
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event portion of the event window, days 0 to -4. Additionally, micro-events with CAARs less
than -4 but more than -1 were linearly stretched to fit the five-day event portion of the window in
a similar fashion. Figure 11, adjusted with the linear interpolation of the event portion of the
window, shows the inclusions in black and the deletions in blue. The deletions are significantly
greater in magnitude, as documented in prior research (Petajisto, 2011).
Figure 11
S&P 500 Index Inclusion Effect Adjusted CAARs Results 1993–2021

The second, normalized figure, Figure 12, is fitted with illustrations for pointing out the
individual areas of the event window where the event studies were designed and conducted for
testing H1 through H5. The normalization draws attention to the symmetry of the results over the
event window, calling attention to the leakage (pre-event), the event, and the reversion (postevent). The event study results reflect similar behavior compared with prior research as
hypothesized. The hypotheses (H1a through H5a) addressing S&P 500 index inclusions, depicted
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in black, will be discussed first, with a summary of the event study results in Table 7.
Hypotheses (H1b through H5b) discussing the S&P 500 deletions, depicted in blue, will follow,
with a summary of the event study results in Table 8.
Figure 12
S&P 500 Index Inclusion Effect Normalized CAARs Results 1993 – 2021

The five hypotheses are testing different areas of the index inclusion effect’s event
window. The design was to test the areas for specific characteristics documented by prior
research to compare the index inclusion event over the period that ETFs have been in the market.
As argued by Petajisto (2011), index changes suffer an inclusion bias to alpha estimates of the
market model; therefore, the standard market model is not used in this research. Therefore, for
testing the hypotheses of the event study results, both direction and CAAR magnitude will use
the market-adjusted returns with the Fama-French Four-Factor (Carhart) model as confirmation.
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Additionally, the cross-sectional test statistic (C sect T) provided by EventStudyTools.com will
be used for determining the statistical significance of the reported CAARs. As previously stated,
all the results for the inclusion are provided in Table 7, with the deletions provided in Table 8.
Over the time that ETFs have participated in the market and referencing Table 7 for the
market-adjusted method’s CAARs, the pre-event leakage was found to be positive and
statistically significant. However, although the Carhart model did show positive leakage, it did
not support the analysis with statistical significance. With direction confirmed and marketadjusted statistical significance, H1a was supported, indicating leakage for inclusions.
The event, AD to ID, is flexible and typically five days in length. Therefore, for
measuring the CAARs and the statistical significance of the CAARs or C sect T, the most
common period of the event was used for determining if H2a was supported by the research. The
reduced number of samples (N = 355) is a direct result of the event length variability. As seen in
Table 7, H2a has significant, positive CAARs for both the market-adjusted method and Carhart
model and is therefore supported.
The post-event portion of the event window dropped three observations (N = 604) from
the analysis because of the currency of the data. As seen in Table 7, the reversion of the CAARs
hypothesized by H3a was demonstrated in both event testing methods with statistical
significance. The reversion of the CAARs immediately after the ID infers that the abnormal
returns are, in part, non-fundamental.
For comparison to prior research, H4a focused on the AD and was designed for testing
the response of markets to the index inclusion’s press release. The event study included a total of
three days (-1, 0, 1), with the PR as day -1, and the AD as day 0. Supporting H4a, 607 inclusions
were leveraged by the event study analysis which found statistically significant CAARs for the
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AD. Market-adjusted method and Carhart model showed nearly 3% CAARs with very high
significance, as shown in Table 7.
The second event frequently observed in prior research is the ID. H5a was created for
observing the behavior of the ID over the period ETFs have been part of U.S. markets. As seen
in Table 7, the ID is positive and significant when using the market-adjusted method.
Additionally, this is confirmed by the Carhart model at the p < 0.10 level.
For inclusions, the expected behavior of abnormal returns through event study’s testing
of the hypotheses (H1a through H5a) were all confirmed. Each of the hypotheses directional
abnormal returns were found statistically significant under the market-adjusted return method
with the direction of the CAARs confirmed by the Carhart model. The summary of results is in
Table 7, below.
Table 7
S&P 500 Index Inclusions Event Study Results 1993-2021
Fama-French (Carhart)
Market-Adjusted
Four-Factor Model
Hypothesis
N
CAAR
C sect T
N
CAAR
C sect T
H1_Pre_Event
607
0.0082
3.5852***
607
0.0012
0.5066
H2_Event
355
0.0228
8.4961***
355
0.0157
6.2799***
H3_Post_Event
604
-0.0144
-4.4962***
604
-0.0228
-7.5394***
H4_AD
607
0.0281
12.3672***
607
0.0272
11.7079***
H5_ID
607
0.0074
3.5243***
607
0.0038
1.8908*
Note. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The event study results for the deletions are provided in Table 8. Over the time that ETFs
have participated in the market, using the market-adjusted method, the pre-event leakage was
negative and statistically significant. Additionally, the Carhart model found negative CAAR
leakage with statistical significance. With direction and market-adjusted statistical significance,
confirmed by the Carhart model, H1b was supported, indicating information leakage.
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The deletion event portion of the event window, AD to DD, is flexible and on average is
five days in length. As in the inclusions, the CAAR and the statistical significance of the CAAR
or C sect T (t_value) over the average duration of the event were used for determining if H2b
was supported by the research. The reduced number of samples (N = 191) is a direct result of the
event length variability. As seen in Table 8, H2b has significant, positive CAARs for both the
market-adjusted method and Carhart model and is therefore supported.
The post-event portion of the event window for deletions also dropped three observations
(N = 272) from the analysis because of the currency of the data. As seen in Table 8, the reversion
of the CAARs hypothesized by H3b was demonstrated in both event testing methods with
statistical significance. The reversion of the CAARs immediately after the DD infers that the
abnormal returns are, in part, non-fundamental.
For comparison to prior research, H4b focused on the AD and was designed for testing
the response of markets to the index inclusion’s press release. The event study included a total of
three days (-1, 0, 1) and was supported by all the sample firms. Market-adjusted method and the
Carhart model showed over 6% CAARs with high significance, as shown in Table 8.
H5b was created for observing the behavior of the DD (opposite the ID for inclusions)
over the period ETFs have been part of U.S. markets. As seen in Table 8, the DD is negative and
significant when using the market-adjusted method. Additionally, although the Carhart model
fails to confirm this result at the p < 0.10 level, it does support directionally and in CAAR
magnitude.
For deletions, the expected behavior of CAARs through the hypotheses (H1b through
H5b) were all confirmed. The results of the CAARs across all the hypotheses were found

82

statistically significant under the market-adjusted return method with the direction of the CAARs
confirmed by the Carhart model. The summary of results is in Table 8.
Table 8
S&P 500 Index Deletions Event Study Results 1993-2021
Fama-French (Carhart)
Market-Adjusted
Four-Factor Model
Hypothesis
N
CAAR
C sect T
N
CAAR
C sect T
H1_Pre_Event
275
-0.0579 -4.9138***
275
-0.0429
-3.8012***
H2_Event
191
-0.0319 -5.2318***
191
-0.0194
-3.3144***
H3_Post_Event
272
0.0240
2.0506**
272
0.0388
3.2862***
H4_AD
275
-0.0627 -4.5956***
275
-0.0604
-4.6405***
H5_ID
275
-0.0164
-2.0458**
275
-0.0107
-1.3779
Note. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
For completing the investigation of RQ1 and initiating examination of RQ2, hypotheses
H6a and H6b were tested with well over one hundred event studies. Again, these event studies
were performed leveraging the online platform offered by www.eventstudytools.com (Schimmer
et al., 2014). Continuing with the S&P 500 index inclusions and deletions, two macro event
studies were designed to show the progression of CAARs by year over the period in which ETFs
have been available in U.S. markets. Two event study methods were used to produce results: the
market-adjusted method, and the Fama-French Four-Factor model, also known as the Carhart
model. Again, the market-adjusted method will be used as the primary evaluation for CAARs
and statistical significance with the Carhart model confirming direction. Each event study
method was conducted focused on the AD of the event. For this research, the day of the
announcement is the press release date (PR) which is after the close on the day of the
announcement. The AD is the day after the announcement where the information is first
discoverable in the closing price. Therefore, H6 was evaluated using (-1, 0) for the AD in all the
event studies testing hypotheses H6a and H6b, a smaller two-day event window.
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The inclusion CAARs by year are generally positive and statistically significant, and as
observed in prior research, peak in the year 2000 (Petajisto, 2011). Over the years, it is
observable that the CAARs decreased in magnitude. This decrease is most apparent in 2018,
2019, and 2020 when the inclusions are negative. This analysis is confirmed by the Carhart
model as well. In addition to the waning CAARs, the statistical significance of the abnormal
returns decreases. This decrease is consistently experienced with a relatively high yearly sample
size suggesting that the declining abnormal returns may be related to a disappearing index
inclusion effect within the S&P 500. To further illustrate the reduction in the abnormal returns
from S&P 500 index inclusion effect over time, analysis was also conducted by decade (19932000, 2001-2010, and 2011-2021). Although observed in prior research, H6a formalizes the
question and is preliminarily tested by the observed and continued yearly decline in CAARs for
S&P 500 inclusions over time. The entire set of event studies for this analysis is provided in
Table 9.
Table 9
S&P 500 Index Inclusion Event Study Results by Year (1993-2021)

Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

N
7
12
20
18
20
36
35
48
25
20
8
15
17

Market-Adjusted
CAAR
C sect T
0.0340
1.9254*
0.0325
7.1757***
0.0190
3.1868***
0.0330
3.6128***
0.0444
3.3057***
0.0416
5.7705***
0.0415
5.5944***
0.0470
4.9844***
0.0210
1.5645
0.0375
5.6863***
0.0194
2.0849**
0.0212
3.8598***
0.0273
5.8070***
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N
7
12
20
18
20
36
35
48
25
20
8
15
17

Fama-French (Carhart)
Four-Factor Model
CAAR
C sect T
0.0331
1.8589*
0.0337
7.6596***
0.0183
2.8412***
0.0312
3.1868***
0.0446
3.3689***
0.0442
5.8051***
0.0449
6.2543***
0.0530
6.4526***
0.0207
1.5702
0.0284
3.5857***
0.0216
2.1054**
0.0198
3.7327***
0.0260
5.8405***

Table 9
S&P 500 Index Inclusion Event Study Results by Year (1993-2021)
Fama-French (Carhart)
Market-Adjusted
Four-Factor Model
Year
N
CAAR
C sect T
N
CAAR
C sect T
2006
23
0.0434
6.0939***
23
0.0412
6.0046***
2007
33
0.0194
3.3124***
33
0.0175
3.2377***
2008
37
0.0333
4.6529***
37
0.0311
3.8629***
2009
21
0.0175
2.3138**
21
0.0204
2.4638**
2010
15
0.0286
3.2931***
15
0.0286
3.1719***
2011
16
0.0134
1.9631**
16
0.0070
0.8397
2012
14
0.0219
2.8752***
14
0.0201
2.7137***
2013
14
0.0227
3.7674***
14
0.0236
3.7988***
2014
12
0.0096
0.7258
12
0.0095
0.8188
2015
19
0.0223
3.1280***
19
0.0231
2.9458***
2016
26
0.0067
1.1073
26
0.0063
1.1835
2017
27
0.0068
0.9772
27
0.0030
0.4877
2018
23
-0.0042
-0.4098
23
-0.0075
-0.7357
2019
16
-0.0094
-0.9452
16
-0.0107
-1.0919
2020
13
-0.0029
-0.2436
13
-0.0046
-0.4207
2021
17
0.0265
1.7297*
17
0.0214
1.5157
1993-2000
196
0.0393
11.2176***
196
0.0417
12.3414***
2001-2010
214
0.0275
10.2511***
214
0.0259
9.4151***
2011-2021
197
0.0096
3.3731***
197
0.0075
2.7339***
1993-2021
607
0.0255
14.1224***
607
0.0250
13.9253***
Note. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
The deletion CAARs by year are generally negative and statistically significant but
experience a more uneven yearly pattern than the inclusions. As observed in prior research, the
deletion CAARs exhibit more extreme absolute values and significantly greater variation yearover-year (Petajisto, 2011). Note that the availability of data for deletions reduces the number of
yearly samples, for which a single event may have an outsized impact on the yearly CAAR and
its significance. This research did not exclude any deletions in this analysis. Although some
years demonstrate significant abnormal returns (2001, 2003, and 2005), it is observable that the
CAARs increase, or become less negative over time. This increase begins to appear in 2011 with
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a positive CAAR, confirmed by the Carhart model. The increasing deletion CAARs continue
with positive abnormal returns in the years 2014, 2016, 2017, and 2020. The ongoing increasing
(less negative) CAARs are confirmed by the Carhart model as well. In addition to the less
negative CAARs, the statistical significance of the abnormal returns decreases in magnitude, like
the inclusions. This decrease is consistently experienced with a relatively high yearly sample size
suggesting that the increasing abnormal returns may be related to a disappearing index inclusion
effect within the S&P 500. To further illustrate the reduction in the magnitude of the abnormal
returns from the S&P 500 index inclusion effect over time, analysis was also conducted by
decade (1993-2000, 2001-2010, and 2011-2021). Although observed in prior research, H6b
formalizes the question and is tested by the observed and continued yearly increase in CAARs
for S&P 500 inclusions over time. The entire set of event studies for this analysis is provided in
Table 10.
Table 10
S&P 500 Index Deletion Event Study Results by Year (1993-2021)

Year
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007

N
6
8
11
11
5
7
9
25
11
13
2
7
4
10
11

Market-Adjusted
CAAR
C sect T
-0.0328
-1.0877
-0.0138
-1.3715
-0.0475
-3.0414***
-0.0393
-3.2927***
-0.0540
-3.079***
-0.0345
-1.7331*
-0.0898
-0.7404
-0.1130
-3.1705***
-0.2724
-1.6104
-0.1393
-2.6180***
-0.3954
-2.9116***
-0.0250
-2.1193**
-0.2538
-1.1842
-0.0825
-1.6159
-0.0030
-0.4295
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N
6
8
11
11
5
7
9
25
11
13
2
7
4
10
11

Fama-French (Carhart)
Four-Factor Model
CAAR
C sect T
-0.0281
-0.9664
-0.0201
-1.2261
-0.0448
-2.7499***
-0.0369
-2.7980***
-0.0463
-2.4514**
-0.0259
-1.2907
-0.0925
-0.7686
-0.1003
-2.9246***
-0.2730
-1.6009
-0.1428
-3.0666***
-0.3636
-4.5302***
-0.0227
-2.0111**
-0.2517
-1.1341
-0.0758
-1.5267
-0.0068
-1.0936

Table 10
S&P 500 Index Deletion Event Study Results by Year (1993-2021)
Fama-French (Carhart)
Market-Adjusted
Four-Factor Model
Year
N
CAAR
C sect T
N
CAAR
C sect T
2008
14
-0.1368
-1.1985
14
-0.1435
-1.3797
2009
13
-0.0427
-4.3062***
13
-0.0546
-3.5624***
2010
6
-0.0025
-0.1781
6
-0.0077
-0.5476
2011
8
0.0096
1.2855
8
0.0126
1.4742
2012
6
-0.0059
-0.7248
6
-0.0070
-0.8940
2013
7
-0.0213
-6.1204***
7
-0.0192
-5.3989***
2014
8
0.0067
1.7349*
8
0.0048
1.2139
2015
8
-0.0296
-1.8814*
8
-0.0035
-0.1972
2016
9
0.0217
2.8298***
9
0.0116
1.4025
2017
15
0.0097
2.0108**
15
0.0116
2.1640**
2018
7
-0.0096
-1.7635*
7
-0.0055
-0.6791
2019
11
-0.0180
-0.9380
11
-0.0128
-0.6857
2020
11
0.0191
1.0822
11
-0.0064
-0.3950
2021
12
-0.0036
-0.3430
12
-0.0025
-0.2384
1993-2000
82
-0.0669
-3.8241***
82
-0.0608
-3.5512***
2001-2010
91
-0.1113
-3.6345***
91
-0.1137
-3.8368**
2011-2021
102
0.0001
0.0301
102
-0.0003
-0.0800
1993-2021
275
-0.0567
-4.8119***
275
-0.0559
-4.8757***
Note. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
For further verifying the inclusion and deletion CAARs and their corresponding
movement to zero over the years, a difference-in-means test is conducted. The difference-inmeans test is simply the inclusion CAARs minus the deletion CAARs. Using the sample size and
the standard deviation from the respective CAR, the statistical significance was then calculated.
The difference-in-means was calculated for both event study methods’ CAAR results. With the
generally positive inclusions and the deletion CAARs generally negative by year, the overall
analysis shows that the CAARs generated by the S&P 500 index inclusion effect are large and
statistically significant. However, when broken down by year and analyzed over the decades a
different result can be seen. As observed in the inclusions and deletions, the difference-in-means
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analysis decreases in magnitude as time progresses. Additionally, statistical significance weakens
and routinely loses significance beginning in 2010. The early years establish differences in
CAARs which are significant; however, it is observable that the differences in inclusion and
deletion CAARs decrease over time. This decrease begins in 2011 with some negative
differences in CAARs occurring in 2016, 2017, and 2020. The decreasing magnitude of the
differences in CAARs is confirmed by the Carhart model. In addition to the decrease in
differences between the CAARs, the statistical significance of the differences in means decreases
in magnitude. In fact, over the last decade of analysis, the significance of the difference in means
only finds significance in 2012, 2013, and 2015. This decrease is consistently experienced with a
relatively high yearly sample size suggesting that the increasing abnormal returns may be related
to a disappearing index inclusion effect within the S&P 500. To further illustrate the reduction in
the magnitude of the abnormal returns from S&P 500 index inclusion effect over time, the
difference-in-means analysis was conducted by decade (1993-2000, 2001-2010, and 2011-2021).
The drop of the difference in CAARs is drastic and the movement of the statistical significance
from highly significant to not, at the p < 0.05 level. This decade-over-decade change shows a
considerable reduction in the S&P 500 index inclusion effect. The difference-in-means testing
supports the findings previously established for the tables which were used to test H6a and H6b.
The entire set of the difference-in-means tests for the inclusion and deletion event studies for this
analysis is provided in Table 11.

88

Table 11
S&P 500 Index Difference in Means (Inclusions – Deletions) by Year (1993-2021)
Fama-French (Carhart)
Market-Adjusted
Four-Factor Model
Year
CAAR
t_stat
CAAR
t_stat
1993
0.0668
1.983**
0.0612
1.857*
1994
0.0463
3.134***
0.0547
3.698***
1995
0.0665
4.749***
0.0631
4.271***
1996
0.0723
4.836***
0.0681
4.195***
1997
0.0984
3.451***
0.0909
3.211***
1998
0.0761
4.115***
0.0701
3.619***
1999
0.1313
2.147**
0.1374
2.267**
2000
0.1600
5.570***
0.1533
5.657***
2001
0.2934
2.620***
0.2937
2.604***
2002
0.1768
4.082***
0.1712
4.446***
2003
0.4148
7.265***
0.3852
10.054***
2004
0.0462
4.085***
0.0425
3.914***
2005
0.2811
2.965***
0.2777
2.821***
2006
0.1259
3.627***
0.1170
3.470***
2007
0.0224
2.040**
0.0243
2.410**
2008
0.1701
2.429***
0.1746
2.717***
2009
0.0602
4.864***
0.0750
4.701***
2010
0.0311
1.902*
0.0363
2.155**
2011
0.0038
0.344
-0.0056
-0.423
2012
0.0278
2.160**
0.0271
2.165**
2013
0.0440
4.905***
0.0428
4.633***
2014
0.0029
0.175
0.0047
0.320
2015
0.0519
3.482***
0.0266
1.647*
2016
-0.0150
-1.327
-0.0053
-0.515
2017
-0.0029
-0.274
-0.0086
-0.945
2018
0.0054
0.281
-0.0020
-0.104
2019
0.0086
0.433
0.0021
0.108
2020
-0.0220
-1.059
0.0018
0.094
2021
0.0301
1.478
0.0239
1.253
1993-2000
0.1062
8.484***
0.1025
8.386***
2001-2010
0.1388
6.822***
0.1396
7.070***
2011-2021
0.0095
1.962**
0.0078
1.697*
1993-2021
0.0822
9.819***
0.0809
9.917***
Note. *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
For further investigating and confirming the change in CAARs and their significance
over time, a difference-in-means of the decades was conducted for the inclusions and separately
89

for the deletions. First, the inclusions’ difference-in-means by decade reveals that the decline has
accelerated and become more significant over the decades. The final comparison of the
differences between 1993-2000 and 2011-2021 resulted in a high CAAR value of 0.0297 and a
highly statistically significant test statistic (t-stat) of 6.574. This confirms the decreasing CAARs
from the inclusions of the S&P 500 index inclusion effect over time. The set of S&P 500 index
inclusion difference in means tests are provided in Table 12.
Table 12
S&P 500 Index Inclusions Difference in Means by Decade
Market-Adjusted
Four-Factor Model
Decades
CAAR
t_stat
CAAR
t_stat
(1993-2000) – (2001-2010)
0.0118
2.702***
0.0158
3.657***
(2001-2010) – (2011-2021)
0.0179
4.571***
0.0184
4.725***
(1993-2000) – (2011-2021)
0.0297
6.574***
0.0342
7.857***
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Similarly, a difference-in-means of the S&P 500 index deletions by decade was
conducted to confirm the change in CAARs and their significance over time. The deletions’
difference-in-means by decade reveals that although the peak negative abnormal returns occur in
the middle decade, there is a consistently less negative final decade. The final comparison of the
differences between 1993-2000 and 2011-2021 resulted in a high CAAR value of -0.067 and a
statistically significant test statistic (t-stat) of -4.124. This analysis shows the less negative
CAARs from the deletions of the S&P 500 index inclusion effect over time. The S&P 500 index
inclusion difference in means tests are provided in Table 13.

90

Table 13
S&P 500 Index Deletions Difference in Means by Decade
Market-Adjusted
Four-Factor Model
Decades
CAAR
t_stat
CAAR
t_stat
(1993-2000) – (2001-2010)
0.0444
1.224
0.0529
1.502
(2001-2010) – (2011-2021) -0.1114
-3.815***
-0.1134
-4.015***
(1993-2000) – (2011-2021) -0.0670
-4.124***
-0.0605
-3.818
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The Disappearance of the Index Inclusion Effect – Regression Results
To complete the investigation into RQ2, regression analysis was performed. The analysis
was for confirming H6 and examining H7 and H8. In total, 24 regressions were completed. The
breakdown of the regression analysis proceeds as follows, two to test H7a, two to test H7b, ten
for testing H8a, and ten for testing H8b. Additionally, the regression results for H8 are used for
confirming the acceptance of H6 findings, supporting the conclusion that the magnitude of
abnormal returns (CAARs) is declining.
Regressions 1 and 2 (R1 and R2) involved regressing yearly and quarterly percent ETF
market cap of the S&P 500 on the inclusion CAARs over the 1993 to 2000 period. These two
regressions were designed for testing H7a. The results were calculated using the statistical
program R and are in Table 14.
Table 14
R1 and R2 Regression Results for H7a
Regression
R1

R2

R1

Estimate Std. Error

t_value

p_value

Intercept

0.08016

0.06988

1.147

0.295

MC Ann (93-00)

-39.35775

63.09250

-0.624

0.5557

Intercept

0.01146

0.02210

0.519

0.608

MC Qtr (93-00)

20.72452

19.80013

1.047

0.304

R2
0.06091

0.03523

Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
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R1 and R2 show no statistical significance between the variables. Although there is a
positive slope for R2’s best-fit line (see Figure 13), there is not a statistically significant linear
relationship. Additionally, the R2 statistical measure, representing the proportion of the variance
in the CAARs that is explained by the percent of the S&P 500 owned by ETFs is small, but again
not significant.
Figure 13
R2 Regression Results

H7a is not supported by the regression analysis. Although the best fit line does appear to
show a positive relationship for the data over the 1993-2000 period, it is not statistically
significant. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis as the linear relationship hypothesized
is not established.
R3 and R4 involved regressing yearly and quarterly percent ETF ownership of the S&P
500 on the deletion CAARs over the 1993 to 2000 period. These two regressions were designed
for testing H7b. The results were calculated using the statistical program R and are in Table 15.
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Table 15
R3 and R4 Regression Results for H7b
Regression Coefficient Estimate
R3

R4

Std. Error

t_value

p_value

Intercept

-0.1392

0.2598

-0.536

0.611

MC Ann
(93-00)

77.8535

234.5799

0.332

0.7513

Intercept

0.05655

0.10704

0.528

0.601

R2
0.01803

0.02879
MC Qtr
-90.39448 95.90670
-0.943
0.3535
(93-00)
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
R3 and R4 show no statistical significance between the variables. Although there is a
negative slope for R4’s best-fit line (see Figure 14), there is not a statistically significant linear
relationship.
Figure 14
R4 Regression Results

H7b is not supported by the regression analysis. Although the best fit line does appear to
show a negative relationship for the data over the 1993-2000 period, it is not statistically
significant. Therefore, we fail to reject the null hypothesis as the linear relationship hypothesized
is not established.
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The results for the ten regressions designed for testing H8a are summarized next. R5
through R12 regress yearly and quarterly percent ETF ownership of the S&P 500 on the
inclusion CAARs, covering varying periods of time post-2000. The final two regressions for H8a
are R13 and R14, which focus on the specific inclusion events over 2017 through 2021. The
results were calculated using the statistical program R and are in Table 16.
Table 16
R5 – R14 Regression Results for H8a
Regression
R5 – Ann
(2001-2010)
R6 – Qrtly
(2001-2010)
R7 – Ann
(2011-2021)
R8 – Qrtly
(2011-2021)
R9 – Ann
(2000-2021)
R10 – Qrtly
(2000-2021)
R11 – Ann
(1993-2021)
R12 – Qrtly
(1993-2021)
R13 – S&P
500 ETFs - Qtr

Coefficient
Intercept
MC Ann
(01-10)
Intercept
MC Qtr
(01-10)
Intercept
MC Ann
(11-21)
Intercept
MC Qtr
(11-21)
Intercept
MC Ann
(00-21)
Intercept
MC Qtr
(00-21)
Intercept
MC Ann
(93-21)
Intercept
MC Qtr
(93-21)
Intercept
OWN Qtr

Std.
Estimate
Error
0.035697 0.006394

t_value
5.583***

p_value
0.000342

-1.198341 0.963104

-1.244

0.244835

0.034567 0.006187

5.587***

1.56e-06

-0.718124 0.894730

-0.803

0.4267

0.033700 0.011060

3.048**

0.0138

-1.325330 0.600730

-2.206*

0.05478

0.021940 0.011700

1.875*

0.0677

-0.697490 0.623540

-1.119

0.2697

0.036716 0.003939

9.322***

1.02e-08

-1.465517 0.284713

-5.147***

4.903e-05

0.036775 0.004081

9.012***

4.65e-14

-1.404563 0.288591

-4.867***

5.088e-06

0.036743 0.002665

13.790***

9.68e-14

-1.467529 0.220910

-6.643***

3.961e-07

0.034838 0.002823

12.340***

< 2e-16

-1.290558 0.229037

-5.635***

1.285e-07

0.033530 0.042430

0.790

0.440

-0.913260 1.247230

-0.732

0.473
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R2
0.1468

0.01551

0.351

0.02893

0.5698

0.216

0.6204

0.2178
0.02893

Table 16
R5 – R14 Regression Results for H8a
Std.
Estimate
Error
0.018690 0.024820

Regression
Coefficient
t_value
p_value
R2
R14 – S&P
Intercept
0.753
0.453
500 ETFs
0.004062
OWN Event -0.450060 0.726860
-0.619
0.5373
(Event)
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
R5 through R8 analyze the inclusions over the two decades (2001-2010) and (20112021), which show no statistical significance between the variables. Although there is a negative
slope for R5 through R8’s best-fit line there is not a statistically significant linear relationship.
However, when expanding the sample across the two decades beginning in 2000, a highly
significant negative relationship is confirmed. The statistically significant negative linear
relationship is confirmed in the annual and quarterly regressions for 2000-2021 and for 19932021. Additionally, the R2 statistical measure, representing the proportion of the variance in the
CAARs that is explained by the percent of the S&P 500 owned by ETFs is substantial and
statistically significant. The R2 is 0.5698 (annually) and 0.216 (quarterly) for (2000-2021) and
0.6204 and 0.2178 for (1993-2021) annually and quarterly, respectively.
Figure 15
R10 Regression Results
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Figure 16
R12 Regression Results

Figures 15 and 16 show the plots of the regression results with residuals and the best fit
line for R10 and R12 for the quarterly IVs and DVs. Using the data that spans over the entire
period in question for testing H8a, the analysis shows that there is a statistically significant
negative linear relationship between CAARs and ETFs’ ownership of the S&P 500. Although
many of the other periods and IVs did not show support, the most complete data set was the two
IVs that did result in a statistically significant negative relationship between the variables.
Therefore, this hypothesis is supported by the regression analysis, and we can reject the null
hypothesis. The hypothesized, negative linear relationship is established. Additionally, the
regression analysis confirms H6a’s findings that inclusion CAARs are significantly decreasing
over the period 2000 through 2021.
The results for the ten regressions designed for testing H8b are summarized next. R15
through R24 regress yearly and quarterly percent ETF ownership of the S&P 500 on the deletion
CAARs, covering varying periods of time post-2000. The final two regressions for H8b are R23
and R24 which focus on the specific deletion events over 2017 through 2021. The results were
calculated using the statistical program R and are in Table 17.
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Table 17
R15 – R24 Regression Results for H8b
Regression
R15 – Ann
(2001-2010)
R16 – Qrtly
(2001-2010)
R17 – Ann
(2011-2021)
R18 – Qrtly
(2011-2021)
R19 – Ann
(2000-2021)
R20 – Qrtly
(2000-2021)
R21 – Ann
(1993-2021)
R22 – Qrtly
(1993-2021)

Coefficient Estimate Std. Error
Intercept
-0.220550 0.078030
MC Ann
14.921660 11.75285
(01-10)
Intercept
-0.180200 0.056680
MC Qtr
13.897120 8.196830
(01-10)
Intercept
-0.002272 0.018798
MC Ann
0.019528 1.021462
(11-21)
Intercept
0.002995 0.018848
MC Qtr
-0.516313 1.004542
(11-21)
Intercept
-0.169260 0.037160
MC Ann
8.651970 2.686020
(00-21)
Intercept
-0.123210 0.025230
MC Qtr
6.023570 1.784410
(00-21)
Intercept
-0.107820 0.025790
MC Ann
4.987590 2.138520
(93-21)
Intercept
-0.078600 0.017220
MC Qtr
3.381910 1.396660
(93-21)
Intercept
0.012410 0.031430
OWN Qtr
0.695770 0.934210

t_value
-2.826**

p_value
0.0198

1.270

0.2361

-3.179***

0.00277

1.695*

0.09740

-0.121

0.906

0.019

0.985

0.159

0.875

-0.514

0.610

-4.555***

0.000193

3.221***

0.004285

-4.883***

4.77e-06

3.376***

0.001107

-4.180***

0.000275

2.332**

0.027391

-4.566***

1.27e-05

2.421**

0.017

R2
0.1519
0.06406
4.061e-05
0.006251
0.3416
0.117
0.1677
0.04892

R23 – S&P
0.395
0.698
500
0.02989
0.745
0.466
ETFs – Qtr
R24 – S&P Intercept
0.024800 0.036370
0.682
0.498
500
0.007489
OWN Event
0.672770 1.053980
0.638
0.526
ETFs (Event)
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively
R15 through R18 analyze the deletions over the two decades (2001-2010) and (20112021) which show no statistical significance between the variables at the p < 0.05 level.
Although there is a positive slope for R15 through R18’s best-fit line there is not a statistically
significant linear relationship. However, when expanding the sample across the two decades
beginning in 2000 a highly significant positive relationship is confirmed. The statistically
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significant positive linear relationship is confirmed in the annual and quarterly regressions for
2000-2021 and for 1993-2021. Additionally, the R2 statistical measure, representing the
proportion of the variance in the CAARs that is explained by the percent of the S&P 500 owned
by ETFs is substantial and statistically significant. The R 2 is 0.3416 (annually) and 0.117
(quarterly) for (2000-2021) and 0.1677 and 0.04892 for (1993-2021) annually and quarterly,
respectively.
Figure 17
R20 Regression Results

Figure 18
R22 Regression Results
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Figures 17 and 18, show the plot of the regression results with residuals and the best fit
line for R20 and R22, for the quarterly IV and DV. Using the data that spans over the entire
period in question for testing H8b, the analysis shows that there is a statistically significant
positive linear relationship between CAARs and ETFs ownership of the S&P 500. Although
many of the other periods and IVs did not show support, the most complete data set was the two
IVs that did result in a statistically significant positive relationship between the variables.
Therefore, this hypothesis is supported by the regression analysis, and we can reject the null
hypothesis as the linear relationship hypothesized is established. Additionally, the regression
analysis confirms H6b’s findings that deletion CAARs are substantially increasing (becoming
less negative and approaching zero) over the period 2000 through 2021.
Perhaps the most interesting observation for the regression analysis is not the support for
the hypotheses but the decline in the relationship between the variables over time. The decline
appears to be driven by the decreasing magnitude of the CAARs over time and when regressed
with the increasing ETF ownership, creates a nearly flat line for both inclusions and deletions.
This is especially true for the deletions in the 2011-2021 period. Based on the slope measurement
and fluctuation from nearly 0 but still positive in the annual regression R17 (Figure 19) to
slightly negative in the quarterly regression R18 (Figure 20). The disappearance of the S&P 500s
index inclusion effect is further observed by the essentially invisible R 2 of 4.061e-05 and
0.006251 for the annual and quarterly (2011-2021) regression. Although not significant, the R 2
statistical measure, representing the proportion of the variance in the CAARs that is explained by
the percent of the S&P 500 owned by ETFs does trend from substantial to non-existent.
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Figure 19
R17 Regression Results

Figure 20
R18 Regression Results

Price Discovery Results
In investigating RQ3, a new price discovery method was established and employed for
testing H9a and H9b. The new method creates an entirely new technique for calculating the cost
for a portfolio to take or leave a position in an underlying asset. This price discovery method is
named Weighted Returns Generated (WRG) and allows for comparing costs experienced by
portfolios, like ETFs, when building their portfolio of underlying assets. Again, there are two
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macro events—inclusions and deletions—so two analyses are provided. Additionally, two ETFs
are analyzed and compared within the inclusions and separately within the deletions in relation to
the index inclusion event of the S&P 500. The SPY and IVV, the two largest ETFs that track the
S&P 500 by assets under management (AUM), are investigated.
The analyses test H9, which hypothesizes the relative performance of two ETFs entering
positions upon an inclusion (deletion) event, as measured by the WRG price discovery method.
The tests compare two extremely similar ETFs which have different replication strategies. The
SPY, as an investment trust is a fully replicating ETF while the IVV is an OEF, which affords it
some flexibility of timing and asset ownership when including assets upon an S&P 500 index
inclusion event. The research is limited by an ETF’s holdings data, which FactSet provided for
the period of July 2016 through January 2022. For the inclusions, 101 firms, and for deletions, 58
firms, were identified based on S&P 500 inclusion events and the availability of daily ETF
holding volume data from FactSet.
The WRG price discovery method was first conducted for inclusions resulting in a SPY
inclusion average WRG (AWRG) and an IVV inclusion AWRG. The difference in means
between the SPY and IVV AWRG for S&P 500 index inclusions was then calculated for
measuring the statistical significance of differences. Then the same process was performed for
each ETF for their deletions.
Since the inclusions and the deletions of the analyses followed similar processes and
outcomes, the summary of results will be provided together from the view of the ETFs. Both
SPY and IVV behaved remarkably similarly in their approach to acquiring and removing
holdings from their portfolios. This is evident in Table 18, where the inclusions’ means differed
by a mere 0.015%, and the deletions differed by only 0.07%. With such low differences across
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the holdings, it is not surprising that significance for the differences was not established. The
results show that we must fail to reject the null hypotheses and find that H9a and H9b are not
supported. Table 18 provides the results of the AWRG measures used to analyze and calculate
the difference in means between each of the ETFs under investigation.
Table 18
H9a and H9b Price Discovery Difference in Means Results
SPY & IVV Difference in Means
SPY
IVV
Event
Type
AWRG
sd
N
AWRG
sd
N
Diff
Inclusions 0.008078 0.071500 101 0.008228 0.071250 101 0.000150
Deletions 0.028049 0.316557
58
0.028748 0.316378
58
0.000699
Note: *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

t_stat
0.015
0.012

Implications
The investigation into ETFs’ impact on markets through the index inclusion effect began
with developing a history of abnormal returns for comparing with prior research’s findings. The
study then focused on understanding ETFs’ impact on underlying assets through examining
abnormal returns and their relationship with ETFs’ increasing market ownership. Finally,
building on the previous steps of the research, an analysis of specific ETFs’ participation during
the inclusion and deletion events was performed.
Nearly three decades of S&P 500 index changes were used for exploring the first research
question focused on the current state of the index inclusion effect. The results from the first ten
hypotheses, exploring the behavior of the index inclusion effect found that statistically
significant abnormal returns are created by the index inclusion events. The event studies, in
aggregate, demonstrated consistent results with prior research for both the inclusions and
deletions. The direction and size of the inclusion CAARs were on the lower side when
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comparing the 2.55% inclusion premium with Shleifer’s (1986) addition premium of 3%, Lynch
and Mendenhall’s (1997) 3.8%, and Petajisto’s (2011) 8.1% (1990-2005). The deletions also are
in-line with earlier literature in direction and were on the lower side in magnitude as well. The 5.67% deletion premium is lower than Lynch and Mendenhall’s (1997) -12.69%, and Petajisto’s
(2011) -15.1% (1990-2005), but as with the inclusions, the measures are not perfectly aligned.
Patel and Welch (2017) found similar decreases in the magnitude of the two-day returns over
time from 4% in the 1990’s to 2% in 2015.
The comparison of results provides a general understanding of the direction and size of
the abnormal returns observed, as the researchers used different data, samples, models, and event
duration to achieve results. Despite the differences however, prior research findings achieve a
commonality among the results, which is validating. Additionally, the lower abnormal returns
experienced from this study should not be concerning, as it is likely an outcome of the finding
that the abnormal returns from the index inclusion event are diminishing.
The findings from the event studies, testing RQ1 related hypotheses (H1a and H1b
through H5a and H5b), show that the pre-event, event, post-event, AD, and ID all behave as
predicted and in accordance with prior research. These results support the notion that the S&P
500 index inclusion event is behaving similarly to past periods. However, the less severe
abnormal returns, although not directly comparable to earlier research, does imply that there is a
declining impact from the index inclusion effect within the S&P 500. The identified declining
abnormal returns occur with the aggressive growth of ETFs. ETFs have exploded in trading
volume and overall market ownership since their introduction in January 1993. The inference is
that ETFs may be responsible for some portion of the perceived decline in abnormal returns.
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The noticeable decrease in the amount of the abnormal returns for both the inclusions and
deletions are investigated through various comparisons of the index inclusion event’s abnormal
returns over various periods of time and through regression analysis. This analysis transitions
from addressing the first research question to the second starting with the testing of diminishing
abnormal returns in hypothesis H6. Next, research question two is further investigated by testing
for the linear relationship between ETF ownership and the abnormal returns in hypotheses H7
and H8. By analyzing the abnormal returns over time and executing regression analysis, an
understanding of the relationship between ETFs and underlying assets’ markets are explored.
Petajisto (2011) observed a peak of abnormal returns in the year 2000, and Patel and
Welch (2017) state that the S&P 500 index inclusion effect is not permanent as suggested by
Shleifer (1986) and others, but instead is temporary. The latest research on the S&P 500 index
inclusion effect hints that the abnormal returns are diminishing. This research tests for and finds
evidence that the CAARs associated with the S&P 500 index inclusion effect are disappearing.
The detailed results from hundreds of event studies documented in Tables 9 and 10 document the
erosion of the magnitude of abnormal returns over time, especially the last decade (2011-2021).
Additionally, the difference in means testing (see Table 11) indicates the abnormal returns from
inclusion to deletions began to break down beginning in 2011. A further difference in means
testing analysis (see Table 12) shows a greater difference and significance for the earlier decades
with (2011-2021) for inclusions. Separately the difference in means testing shows no statistical
significance for deletions’ difference between (1993-2000) and (2001-2010), but there is a
statistically significant difference in CAARs between the younger decades and (2011-2021). This
finding points to confirmation of index inclusion effect CAARs declining in magnitude.
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If the reduction of ARs is a sign of underlying markets pricing assets more accurately,
then it follows that markets, as it relates to the index inclusion event, are becoming more
efficient. However, it remains unresolved as to the cause of the efficiency or if it is related to
passively managed index tracking ETFs. Additionally, it may be the result of various arbitrage
efforts by institutional investors, like the APs, which may eliminate some of the abnormal
returns. Regardless, of how the index inclusion event ARs are declining in magnitude, it appears
as though market is becoming more efficient.
Next, regression analysis using the quarterly data from 2000 to 2021 finds a statistically
significant negative (positive) linear relationship for percent ETF market cap of the S&P 500 and
CAARs resulting from index inclusion event additions (deletions). Additionally, the regression
analysis results provided a relatively high R2 (inclusions: 21.6%; deletions: 11.7%) for
addressing the variation in CAARs explained by the percent ETF market cap of the S&P 500.
However, the relationship completely disappears when looking at the same variables over the
2011-2021 period.
Finally, one more analysis illustrating the collapse of index inclusion effect is observing
the CAARs over the event window by decade. Figure 21 is Figure 11 but broken down by
decade. In the figure, (1993-2000) is represented by the blue lines and are similar to the grey
lines of (2001-2010). These decades hold expected form as demonstrated in prior research
(Petajisto, 2011) from pre-event through post-event. The 1993-2000 and 2001-2010 decades
experience the leakage, the AD bump, and the post-ID reversion. However, the black lines of the
CAARs for 2011-2021 are very different. The abnormal returns are essentially flat and nearly
zero when compared with the other decades. One element of the 2011-2021 decade that has
remained similar is that the inclusions are still positive, and the deletions are still negative in
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aggregate across the entire event window. Additionally, perhaps it can be argued that pre-event
information leakage remains. Although it was anticipated that the S&P 500 index inclusion effect
would be declining, 2011-2021’s loss of CAAR magnitude, statistical significance, and degree of
change was unanticipated.
Figure 21
Adjusted CAARs by Decade

Figure 22 shows the normalized view of 2011-2021 CAARs. The pre-event leakage is
similar to previous decades and as in prior research, and similarly higher in magnitude on
deletions than on inclusions (Petajisto, 2011). Additionally, for the inclusions, the AD does
appear to result in slightly accelerated abnormal returns and a post-ID reversion. However, the
maximum return does occur on day two not day zero, as anticipated. For the deletions, a
radically different pattern is observed. Although the pre-event leakage is observed, a positive
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abnormal return is observed when the deletion is announced, the exact opposite behavior from
expected. Additionally, there is a random walk and no observable reversion post-ID. Overall,
there was symmetry for inclusion and deletion data from 1993-2010, but for 2011-2021 there is
some coordinated movement but not symmetry. The inclusion and deletion maximum
accumulations for the 2011-2021 decade are uncoordinated and occur on different days within its
decade and from other periods 1993-2010. The 2011-2021 CAARs demonstrate and confirm
earlier analysis that the S&P 500 index inclusion event is no longer a significant event. For
consistency, the event portion of Figures 21 and 22 are linearly interpolated in the same manner
as Figure 11.
Figure 22
Normalized CAARs (2011-2021)
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The final research question RQ3, studies differences in participation in the index
inclusion effect by specific ETFs. The S&P 500 offers up an opportunity to study the two largest
ETFs in the U.S. markets, which are extremely similar. The SPY and IVV have more in common
than they have differences, however, one difference is in how they track their shared index. SPY
is a full replicating ETF that is regulated to hold all the constituents and in the weighting of the
index. To accurately track the index, SPY must buy and sell underlying assets at precisely the
most disadvantageous times within the event window. The IVV was formed as an OEF in May
of 2000. The OEF formation allows IVV to implement a partially replicating strategy to track the
index. This strategy enables IVV great flexibility in the purchase of underlying assets and the
timing of the purchases. After analyzing 101 inclusions and 58 deletions, the differences between
SPY and IVV are unnoticeable. IVV not only participated in every single asset purchase and sale
but concentrated their trades on the same day as SPY. IVV did not take advantage of the
flexibility offered by its replication strategy. This suggests that IVV does not value or understand
the impact on returns for purchasing or selling holdings at the index inclusion events’ highest or
lowest prices.
Two reasons for IVV electing to follow SPY in buying and selling holdings at the worst
moment in the index inclusion event window are arbitration and timing. First is ETFs’
participation in arbitration of the index inclusion event. According to Blume and Edelen (2004),
indexers profit from entering into agreements with liquidity providers, which drives the observed
pattern of abnormal returns. If IVV is a party to such an agreement, the IVV ETF may be
compensated for not using their flexibility and not changing their trading approach to the known
index inclusion event. IVV would participate in the liquidity providers' profits, potentially reduce
trading expenses, and possibly reduce tracking error. As Blume and Edelen (2004) find, for
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achieving small tracking errors for an index, passively managed ETFs should adopt an exactreplication strategy. Second, timing is critical. Not only for ETFs’ entering and exiting large
positions in the stock market but for the index inclusion effect too. The price discovery was
conducted from mid-2016 through 2021 due to the limitation of ETFs’ daily holdings data. The
research analysis for the disappearance of the index inclusion effect finds extreme low abnormal
returns with a loss of statistical significance over the same period. Therefore, it makes sense for
the IVV to follow SPY’s full replication strategy for securing the lowest tracking error because
the index inclusion effect is a non-event over the period studied (mid-2016 to 2021).
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CHAPTER 5 – CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH
This section closes the research by covering the significant findings which contribute to
knowledge in many disciplines and provide key information for the many practitioners across all
of investment finance. Next, the limitations of the research will be provided. Finally, a few future
research opportunities will be discussed.
This research contributes knowledge for a wide range of people (all levels of investors,
academics, government, etc.) and impacts many areas of investing (active versus passive). The
research leverages a deep body of research and extends knowledge in three main areas. First, it
extends S&P 500 index inclusion effect information to respond to a rapidly growing body of
investing with the passive strategy, especially the ETF. This research concentrated on the
impacts of passive ETFs over the entire period they have been in our markets from 1993 to 2021.
Second, this research formally explores the disappearance of the index inclusion effect by
examining how ETFs are influencing abnormal returns across the index inclusion event. Finally,
entirely unique to this research, the WRG process—a price discovery method, was developed for
investigating how ETFs approach passively tracking an index by studying their trading
throughout the index inclusion event.
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Significant Findings
The investigation into the index inclusion effect over the many years that ETFs have been
participating in the U.S. markets was accomplished. The study focused on the S&P 500 index
and the 724 inclusions and 719 deletions from 1993 to 2021, which create what prior research
refers to as the index inclusion effect. Three research questions were addressed, and 18
hypotheses tested with an integrated design of event studies, the difference in means tests,
regression analysis, and price discovery methods.
The first two research questions focused on the state of the index inclusion effect as it
related to the significant growth of index-tracking passively-managed ETFs. RQ1 was addressed
through a series of event studies that tested for the expected behavior of the index inclusion
effect over the established 21-day event window. Various event studies tested ten hypotheses,
five for evaluating the performance of inclusions and five for testing for prior research’s
observed pattern for deletions. Using the market adjusted event study method, in aggregate
(1993-2021), all but one hypothesis was found statistically significant at the p < 0.01 level, with
the last one statistically significant at the p < 0.05 level. The index inclusion effect, although
with CAARs at the lower side of magnitude, demonstrated consistent results with prior research
for both the inclusions and deletions.
Transitioning to RQ2 included extensive event study examination, difference in means
testing, and regression analysis. RQ2 was addressed by the testing of six hypotheses, H6a/b
through H8a/b. Upon investigating the decreasing CAARs past the year 2000, results from
hundreds of event studies and numerous difference in means tests indicated a statistically
significant reduction in abnormal returns associated with the S&P 500’s index inclusion events.
Additionally, as the CAARs were decreasing in magnitude, certain event studies lost statistical
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significance. So, decade data was established, and additional difference in means tests designed
for confirming the disappearance of the index inclusion effect in the 2011-2021 period. H6a and
H6b was not just confirmed, but the additional investigation into the loss of the index inclusion
effect’s abnormal returns found that it has become a non-event. Although over the (2011-2021)
period inclusions remained positive and deletions negative, the magnitude and behavior over the
event window is significantly different than previous years or prior research.
Moving to understanding how ETFs may be influencing the index inclusion events’
abnormal returns, 24 regressions were executed testing hypotheses H7 and H8. Support for H7a
and H7b was not found. The best-fit-line from the quarterly data in the regression analysis for
H7a and H7b did show hypothesized slopes, but the slopes were not found statistically
significant. For investigating H8a and H8b, a statistically significant linear relationship for
inclusions (negative) and deletions (positive) between percent ETF S&P 500 market cap and the
CAARs over the period of 2000-2021 was established. For the inclusions of the index inclusion
event, the slope of -1.40 for R10 may be interpreted to mean that for each percent increase in
ETF market cap of the S&P 500, the predicted S&P abnormal returns (CAARs) decrease by 1.4
percent. Similarly, for the deletions from the index inclusion event, for each percent increase in
ETF market cap of the S&P 500, the predicted abnormal returns (CAARs) increase by 6.0
percent. This research does find that the growth in ownership of the S&P 500 by ETFs is
correlated with the reduction in CAARs. In addition to support for H8a and H8b analysis shows
a relatively high R2 (inclusions: 0.216; deletions: 0.117). This suggests that for inclusions, 21.6%
of the variation in CAARs may be explained by the variation in the percent ETF market cap of
the market. Additionally, for deletions, 11.7% of the variation in the CAARs may be explained
by the variation in the percent ETF market cap of the market.
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The third research question, RQ3 addresses specific ETFs’ participation in the index
inclusion event. This part of the research involves a newly designed price discovery method,
WRG, for calculating the total returns experienced by an ETF as it enters and exits holdings. As
indexers, the ETFs perform these trades over the index inclusion effect event window. The two
ETFs are similar in many ways but differ in how they replicate the index. One ETF (SPY) is a
full replicating ETF and must buy and sell at certain times, while the other ETF (IVV) practices a
partial replicating strategy allowing it to choose holdings and timing of trades. H9a and H9b
hypothesize that the IVV with partial replication, which provides trading flexibility, will trade
tracking error for increased returns. It is expected that the IVV will trade around known index
inclusion event peak abnormal returns and enjoy greater returns than the SPY. However, H9a
and H9b were not supported. In fact, the differences for inclusions (101 holdings) and deletions
(58 holdings) are indistinguishable.
H9a and H9b are likely impacted by the evidence provided when addressing RQ1 and
RQ2. If the S&P 500 index inclusion effect is a non-event in the years 2016 through 2021, then it
would make sense for the partially replicating ETF to ignore any trading strategies for avoiding
the index inclusion event. Additionally, as one of the largest ETFs in the U.S. markets the IVV
may also be part of agreements (Blume & Edelen, 2004) which allow it to share any upside from
the index inclusion event while remaining focused on filling their large block trades to establish
positions when the S&P 500 introduces new constituents.
Research Limitations
The limitations of this research are most significantly related to data discovery.
Identification of the actual events and their exact dates for establishing accurate event windows
was difficult. Aggregation of the press releases and contacting certain firms for support during
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the pandemic was extremely challenging. Without certain support, the identification of the
necessary documentation and the detailed extraction of precise dates was a time-consuming and
laborious, which may have induced some error.
Other data limitations included locating unique tickers for finding pricing data using the
FactSet Sidebar Excel plugin. Where data was not available, the sample was not included in the
research which was infrequent but did occur. Again, of a population of 724, 607 inclusions and
275 deletions were available for the research. Care was taken to make sure the appropriate data
was used for pricing in the event studies; however, with the proliferation of FactSet tickers,
errors in the data are possible.
Finding daily holdings data for ETFs proved challenging. FactSet’s expertise in data
proved extremely valuable but proprietary accumulation of the holdings data required purchasing
FactSet’s ETF data feed. The data sets were extremely large and required unique SQL code for
data extraction.
Limitations of data also affected the ability to create index specific volume variables for
testing and confirming the linear relationship between abnormal returns and passively managed
ETFs. Access to a more thorough data provider, such as Bloomberg or WRDS, would have
provided the data needed to create meaningful volume variables. Prohibitive costs for accessing
data limited independent variable creation.
Another data limitation was the annual variables used for regression analysis. The annual
measures did have a small sample, especially for the 1993 to 2000 period. To address the small
sample size, quarterly variables were created, and additional regression analysis was
accomplished for testing H7 and H8 with a larger sample. The quarterly frequency was chosen to
retain as much variable (CAAR) significance as possible.
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Finally, all event studies suffer from the possibility of confounding variables. The event
study design followed event windows used in prior research (Petajisto, 2011). Although the total
event window studied was 21 days, where possible this research focused on confining the event
windows for avoiding confounding variables. For example, when testing H6 the AD window was
reduced to two days. However, the event study method does experience exposure to confound
issues because all information is market-priced at the same time through the market participants.
Therefore, it is tough to know with absolute certainty that the abnormal returns are due to the
event of interest.
Future Research Opportunities
A few potential research ideas logically follow from this study. The first few ideas
include confirming the findings, developing more in-depth regression analysis, and expanding
the use of the WRG price discovery method. This is followed by proposing to investigate passive
ETFs’ trading behavior in volatile market conditions. Many new market discoveries may be
made through continued examination of ETFs and their market impact. Near the top of the list of
unanswered questions is, what caused the S&P 500 index inclusion event to dissipate?
Further study into the disappearance of the index inclusion effect should be pursued for a
better understanding of the causal forces. The research should include more investigation into the
S&P 500 as well as other indexes. Perhaps searching for regulatory changes or arbitrage volume
variables may be able to explain the muted CAARs from 2011-2021.
Related to the first opportunity is seeking the development of additional variables for
enhanced regression analysis. Creating ETF volume variables directly related to their growth in
trading volume across indexes can be created for confirming the linear relationship established
between ETFs and their underlying assets’ abnormal returns in the index inclusion effect.
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Additionally, developing different factors for multiple regression analysis may lead to a better
understanding of how ETFs and passive funds influence underlying assets’ markets.
The most versatile and perhaps most practical application to expand from this research is
the WRG price discovery method. The S&P 500 ETFs, all types and kinds, including active
ETFs should be tested to see if any ETFs are trading the index inclusion events differently. The
WRG measure may also be used in analyzing ETFs indexing other indices for confirming similar
trading behaviors. The WRG measure may also be used with all portfolio funds, including
Mutual Funds, Pension Funds, and hedge funds, if one can find the data. Finally, the WRG price
discovery method may be independently positioned for analyzing other events, like earnings
announcements for determining specific investor trading behavior during those events.
Another area for future research is studying index inclusion event abnormal returns
during different market conditions. After creating Figure 10, it is critical to the safety of our
markets to understand what passive investing vehicles do in times when the market is under
duress. As illustrated in the figures, it appears that ETF ownership spikes when the market
experiences a sharp downturn. ETFs and their investors appear to be retaining their positions for
extended periods when markets are under duress, suffering large losses as stocks sell-off. This is
ironic if true because in normal market conditions the SPY is perhaps the most liquid asset traded
in the stock market; it is similar to currency. ETF performance may be explored using the WRG
measure for understanding how ETFs trade during times when markets are in crisis revealing
ETF’s liquidity when markets approach failure.

116

References
Agapova, A. (2011). Conventional mutual index funds versus exchange-traded funds. Journal of
Financial Markets, 14(2), 323-343. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.finmar.2010.10.005
Ang, A. (2014). Asset Management: A systematic approach to factor investing. Oxford
University Press.
Antoniewicz, R. (Shelly), & Heinrichs, J. (2014). Understanding Exchange-Traded Funds: How
ETFs Work. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2523540
Asness, C., & Liew, J. (2014). The Great Divide over Market Efficiency. Institutional Investor.
Vol. 48(3), 41-55.
Baker, K. H., Filbeck, G., & Kiymaz, H. (2019). The Savvy Investor's Guide to Pooled
Investments: Mutual Funds, ETFs, and More. Emerald Publishing Limited.
Ball, R., & Brown, P. (1968). An empirical evaluation of accounting income numbers. Journal of
Accounting Research, 6(2), 159. https://doi.org/10.2307/2490232
Barclay, M. J., & Warner, J. B. (1993). Stealth trading and volatility: Which trades move prices?
Journal of Financial Economics, 34, 281-305.
Barclay, M. J., & Hendershott, T. (2003). Price discovery and trading after hours. Review of
Financial Studies, 16(4), 1041-1073. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg030
Barclay, M. J., & Hendershott, T. (2004). Liquidity externalities and adverse selection: evidence
from trading after hours. Journal of Finance, 59, 681-710.
Barclay, M. J., & Hendershott, T. (2008). A comparison of trading and non-trading mechanisms
for price discovery. Journal of Empirical Finance, 15, 839-849.
Ben-David, I., Franzoni, F., & Moussawi, R. (2014). Do ETFs increase volatility? (No. w20071).
National Bureau of Economic Research. https://doi.org/10.3386/w20071

117

Ben-David, I., Franzoni, F., & Moussawi, R. (2017). Exchange-Trade Funds (ETFs). (No.
w22829). National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/paper/w22829
Black, F. (1986). Noise. The Journal of Finance, 41(3), 528-543. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406261.1986.tb04513.x
Blume, M. E., & Edelen R.M. (2004). S&P 500 Indexers, Tracking Errors, and Liquidity.
Wharton School of Business Working Paper, 29.
Bond, P., & Garcıa, D. (2018). The equilibrium consequences of indexing. (SSRN working
Paper). University of Washington.
Brown, D. C., Davies, S. W., & Ringgenberg, M. C. (2019). ETF flows, non-fundamental
demand, and return predictability. (SSRN Working Paper). University of Arizona.
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872414
Buckle, M., Chen, J., Guo, Q., & Tong, C. (2018). Do ETFs lead the price moves? Evidence
from the major US markets. International Review of Financial Analysis, 58, 91-103.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irfa.2017.12.005
Cao, C., Ghysels, E., & Hatheway, F. (2000). Price discovery without trading: Evidence from the
NASDAQ preopening. Journal of Finance. 55, 1339-1365.
Carhart, M.M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of Finance. 52,
57-81.
Chang, Y., Hong, H., & Liskovich, I. (2013). Regression discontinuity and the price effects of
stock market indexing. (NBER Working Paper No. 19290). National Bureau of Economic
Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w19290

118

Chen, H., Noronha, G., & Singal, V. (2004). The price response to S&P 500 index additions and
deletions: Evidence of asymmetry and a new explanation. Journal of Finance 59. 19011930. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.427001.
Davies, S. W. (2017). Speculation Sentiment. SSRN Electronic Journal.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3063551
Denis, D. K., McConnell, J. J., Ovtchinnikov, A. V., & Yu, Y. (2003). S&P 500 index additions
and earnings expectations. The Journal of Finance, 58(5), 1821-1840.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1540-6261.00589
Easley, D., Kiefer, N. & O'Hara, M. (1997). The information content of the trading process.
Journal of Empirical Finance, 4, 159-186.
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., & de Souza, A. (2018). Passive mutual funds and ETFs: Performance
and comparison. Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), 265-275.
https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jbfina/v106y2019icp265-275.html
ETF.com. (2021, April 7). ETF Screener & Database. ETF Finder. ETF.com.
https://www.etf.com/etfanalytics/etf-finder.
ETFdb.com. (2021, September 3). Largest ETFs: Top 100 ETFs By Assets.
https://etfdb.com/compare/market-cap/.
FactSet. (2020, December 15). FactSet Essentials. FactSet.com. https://www.factset.com/.
Fama, E. F. (1965). The behavior of stock-market prices. The Journal of Business, 38(1), 34.
https://doi.org/10.1086/294743
Fama, E. F. (1970). Efficient capital markets: A review of theory and empirical work. The
Journal of Finance, 25(2), 383-417.

119

Fama, E. F. (1991). Efficient capital markets: II. The Journal of Finance, 46(5), 1575.
https://doi.org/10.2307/2328565
Fama, E. F. (1998). Market eﬃciency, long-term returns, and behavioral ﬁnance. Journal of
Financial Economics, 49, 283-306.
Fama, E. & MacBeth, J. (1973). Risk, return, and equilibrium - empirical tests. Journal of
Political Economy, 83, 607-636.
French, K. R. (2008). Presidential address: The cost of active investing. The Journal of Finance,
63(4), 1537-1573. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01368.x
Glosten, L., Nallareddy, S., & Zou, Y. (2016). ETF activity and informational efficiency of
underlying securities. Management Science, 67(1), 22-47.
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2019.3427
Grossman, S. J., & Stiglitz, J. E. (1980). On the impossibility of informationally efficient
markets. The American Economic Review , Vol. 70, No. 3 393-408.
Harris, L., & Gurel, E. (1986). Price and volume effects associated with changes in the S&P 500
list: New evidence for the existence of price pressures. The Journal of Finance, Vol. 41,
No. 4. 815-829.
Hrazdil, K., & Scott, T. (2009). S&P 500 Index revisited: Do index inclusion announcements
convey information about firms’ future performance? Quarterly Journal of Finance and
Accounting, 48(4), 79-113.
Huang, R. D. (2002). The quality of ECN and NASDAQ market maker quotes. Journal of
Finance. 57, 1285-1319.
Investment Company Institute. (2016). 56th edition. Investment Company Fact Book. Retrieved
from https://www.iciglobal.org/pdf/2016_factbook.pdf

120

Investment Company Institute. (2020). 60th edition. Investment Company Fact Book. Retrieved
from https://www.icifactbook.org/data/20_fb_data
Kaul, A., Mehrotra, V., & Morck, R. (2000). Demand curves for stocks do slope down: New
evidence from an index weights adjustment. The Journal of Finance, 55(2), 893-912.
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00230
Kenneth R. French—Data Library. (2022). Retrieved January 31, 2022, from
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html#Research
Lee, C. M. C., Shleifer, A., & Thaler, R. H. (1990). Anomalies: Closed-End mutual funds.
Journal of Economic Perspectives, 4(4), 153-164. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.4.4.153
Lettau, M., & Madhavan, A. (2018). Exchange-Traded funds 101 for economists. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 32(1), 135-154. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.32.1.135
Li, F. W., & Zhu, Q. (2016). Synthetic Shorting with ETFs. (SSRN Working Paper).
https://doi.org/ 10.2139/SSRN.2836518
Linter, J. (1965) The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risk investments in stock
portfolios and capital budgets. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 47 (1). 13-37.
Lynch, A. W., & Mendenhall, R. R. (1997). New evidence on stock price effects associated with
changes in the S&P 500 index. The Journal of Business, 70(3), 351-383.
https://doi.org/10.1086/209722
Mackinlay, A. C. (1997). Event studies in economics and finance. Journal of Economic
Literature, 35(1), 13-39.
Madhavan, A. (2014). Exchange-Traded funds: An overview of institutions, trading, and
impacts. Annual Review of Financial Economics, 6(1), 311-341.
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-financial-110613-034316

121

Madhavan, A. (2016). Exchange traded funds and the new dynamics of investing. Oxford
University Press.
Madhavan, A., & Sobczyk, A. (2014). Price dynamics and liquidity of exchange-traded funds.
SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2429509
Markowitz, H. M., (1952). Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance. 7, 77-91.
Markowitz, H. M., (1959). Portfolio selection: Efficient diversification of investments. Wiley,
New York.
Marshall, B. R., Nguyen, N. H., & Visaltanachoti, N. (2013). Liquidity commonality in
commodities. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(1), 11-20.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2012.08.013
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. (1997). Event studies in management research: Theoretical and
empirical issues. Academy of Management Journal, 40(3), 626-657.
Modigliani, F., & Miller, M. H. (1958). The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of
investment. The American Economic Review. 38(3).
Patel, N., & Welch, I. (2017). Extended stock returns in response to S&P 500 index changes.
Review of Asset Pricing Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), 172-208.
Petajisto, A. (2011). The index premium and its hidden cost for index funds. Journal of
Empirical Finance, 18(2), 271-288. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jempfin.2010.10.002
Richie, N., Daigler, R. T., & Gleason, K. C. (2008). The limits to stock index arbitrage:
Examining S&P 500 futures and SPDRS. Journal of Futures Markets, 28(12), 11821205. https://doi.org/10.1002/fut.20365
Ross, S. A. (1976). The Arbitrage Theory of Capital Asset Pricing. The Journal of Economic
Theory, 13, 341-360.

122

S&P Dow Jones Indices. (2020). SPIVA. U.S. Scorecard. Retrieved from
https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/spiva/spiva-us-mid-year-2020.pdf
Schimmer, M., Levchenko, A., & Müller, S. (2014). EventStudyTools (Research Apps),
St.Gallen. Available on: http://www.eventstudytools.com. Accessed on: August 4, 2021.
Scholes, M. S. (1972). The market for securities: Substitution versus price pressure and the
effects of information on share prices. The Journal of Business, 45(2), 179.
https://doi.org/10.1086/295444.
Securities Exchange Commission. [SEC] (2012). Investor bulletin: Exchange-Traded funds
(ETFs). Office of the Investor Education and Advocacy.
https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/etfs.pdf
Sewell, M. (2011). History of the Efficient Market Hypothesis. (Research Note: RN/11/04).
University College London.
Sharpe, W. F. (1963). A simplified model for portfolio analysis. Management Science, 9(2), 277293. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.9.2.277
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). Capital asset orices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of
risk*. The Journal of Finance, 19(3), 425-442. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15406261.1964.tb02865.x
Sharpe, W. F. (1991). Capital asset prices with and without negative holdings. The Journal of
Finance, 46 (2), 489-509.
Shleifer, A. (1986). Do demand curves for stocks slope down? The Journal of Finance, 41(3),
579-590. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1986.tb04518.x
Stambaugh, R. F. (2014). Presidential address: Investment noise and trends. The Journal of
Finance, 69(4), 1415-1453. https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12174

123

Stratmann, T., & Welborn, J. W. (2012). Exchange-Traded funds, fails-to-deliver, and market
volatility. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2183251
Sushko, V., & Turner, G. (2018). The implications of passive investing for securities mark. BIS
Quarterly Review, 113-131. https://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1803j.htm
Thaler, R. H. (1987a). Anomalies: Seasonal movements in security prices II: Weekend, holiday,
turn of the month, and intraday effects. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(2), 169-177.
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.1.2.169
Thaler, R. H. (1987b). Anomalies: The January effect. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1(1),
197-201. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.1.1.197
Tobin, J. (1958). Liquidity preference as a behavior toward risk. Review of Economic Studies, 25,
65-86.
Treynor, J. L., & Black, F. (1973). How to use security analysis to improve portfolio selection.
The Journal of Business Vol. 46, No. 1, 66-86. https://doi.org/10.1086/295508
Varian, H. (1993). A Portfolio of Nobel Laureates: Markowitz, Miller, and Sharpe. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 7(1), 159-169. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.7.1.159
Wermers, R. (2000). Mutual fund performance: An empirical decomposition into stock-picking
talent, style, transactions costs, and expenses. The Journal of Finance, 55(4), 1655-1695.
https://doi.org/10.1111/0022-1082.00263
Wermers, R., & Xue, J. (2015). Intraday ETF Trading and the Volatility of the Underlying.
[Research paper]. University of Maryland.
Wurgler, J., (2010). On the Economic Consequences of Index-linked Investing. (NBER Working
Paper No. 16376). National Bureau of Economic Research.
http://www.nber.org/papers/w16376.

124

Wurgler, J., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2002). Does arbitrage flatten demand curves for stocks? The
Journal of Business, 75(4), 583-608. https://doi.org/10.1086/341636
Zarowin, P. (1989). Short-run market overreaction: Size and seasonality effects. The Journal of
Portfolio Management, 15(3), 26-29. https://doi.org/10.3905/jpm.1989.409209

125

